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THE CASE OF THE MYSTERIOUS ACCESSORY
R. BRucE TowNsENU*
The American automobile has acquired another accessory. It comes on all models.
This accessory, an impressive little item, is the certificate of title, which serves as the
automobile's passport from dealer to owner to banker to thief, and more often than
not, back to the dealer again. Often it embroils these characters in a mystery of deep
legislation and dark case law. This mystery has found its way into the Uniform
Commercial Code.
The writer believes that he has a solution to this mystery. The illustration of
the proffered solution will require a broad review of the legal aspects of the motor
vehicle title problem as it has been created by legislation and judicial law. Upon this
predicate may be described the role the certificate will play under the new uniform
act, with special attention being given to its use as an instrument for imparting
notice of liens. After this will come the solution.
The slip of paper which serves as a certificate of title originated as a police device
for tracking down stolen automobiles. With such a piece of paper a central motor
vehicle agency is able to identify every automobile by engine serial number, keep
informed of current ownership transfers, maintain permanent records, and provide
the owner with an accessory which informs the public of his ownership rights. This
certificate differs from the established negotiable instruments, the bill of lading, and
the warehouse receipt in that it is no more negotiable than the automobile to which
it is attached. It also differs from the sale receipt or the bill of sale because it has an
official origin. In short it is something new in the commercial world; but the nature
of its commercial value and its significance to the automobile has remained an un-
probed mystery.
The codifiers saw the problem, wrestled with it,' and finally discarded their
efforts to give any degree of uniformity to this certificate of title. Rather the Code
met the issue by a "meshing process," which for lack of a better name is used to
describe a function that will increasingly be faced in the job of uniform codification.
This "meshing process" is the means by which diverse patterns of legislation and
case law are assimilated into a body of uniform private law. For example, the
Code recognizes that constructive notice can be shown through the title certificate
and public records established and maintained under the various title certificate laws.2
*A.B. 1938, Coe College; J.D. 1940, State University of Iowa. Associate Professor of Law, Indiana
University School of Law, Indianapolis Division.
'A Reporter's draft of a comprehensive chapter dealing with the certificate of title problem was
presented in the May, 1949 draft of the Uniform Commercial Code. §7-801 et seq.
For an excellent discussion of the conflicts problems under the title certificate laws, see Leary, Horse
and Buggy Lien Law and Migratory Automobiles, 96 U. oF PA. L. REV. 455 (1948).
'U. C. C. §9-402 (Sept. 1950).
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In so doing, the Code has introduced nothing new, but instead has recognized
and adopted the type of legislation which exists in a majority, but not all; a5
the states. According to the Code, security interests in motor vehicles are perfected
only when the lien is noted upon the records and upon the title certificate. In
addition, the Code does not clearly define the states which are encompassed by the
provision, for it applies only to those states requiring the registration of "all liens"
upon the certificate of title. Thus the Code shuts the door on the possibility that
the title certificate itself may become a new document of commerce which in fact
represents title rights and gives constructive notice of liens.
At the outset it is feasible to illustrate the practical utility of the certificate
of title as a commercial device. Suppose that M, who allegedly owns a Chevrolet,
applies to F bank for a loan upon the security of this car late one Saturday morning.
During the course of the customary interview between M and F's loan officer, M
produces an official certificate of title showing no encumbrances. The officer, after
an examination of the Chevrolet to determine its identity as expressed in the cer-
tificate, is able to make the loan in a very few minutes. The bank can take possession
of the certificate and feel relatively sure that the tide is good. On the other hand,
consider this business routine in states without title certificate laws. The officer of
F, if he is as cautious as he ought to be, will check the chattel mortgage and con-
ditional sale records in the county court house prior to making the loan. This may
be impossible late in the morning because the business week end is at hand. The
transaction, therefore, will be delayed, and if M is in desperate need he will be forced
to resort to a more expensive source of credit. Or the bank, if it makes the loan as a
pure credit risk until the lien can be filed, may subject itself to the wrath of the bank
examiners, to the possibility that a lien has already been entered upon the records,
and to the contingency that M will take his Chevrolet to a used car dealer in the
afternoon. Without examining the lien records and filing the lien F is taking
security of questionable value, and even after such examination and filing there is
the additional risk that M was not the actual owner of the car. This is but one of
the many situations which commend the title certificate to the commercial world
as an indispensable accessory.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
States with registration laws. At the present time fourteen states, including
Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Ver-
mont have adopted legislation requiring registration, but making no provision for
a separate certificate of title.8 As a consequence, the registration certificate or receipt
serves a purpose similar to that of the certificate of title, although the legislation in
these states manifests no clear intent that the mechanics of registration or the registra-
3 See App. x, supra.
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tion instrument should impart notice of ownership.4 Basically, these laws employ
registration as a device for collecting revenue by outlawing the operation of un-
registered vehicles? Additional features, however, tend to make the registration
machinery and the registration certificate a possible source of title information.
Most of these states require the "owner" to register the vehicle upon acquisition,
and the term is usually defined to include mortgagors and conditional buyers in, or
with a right to, possession Upon transfer, the transferor is compelled through
criminal sanctions to notify the vehicle department of the transfer, either upon the
registration certificate, or in a manner otherwise prescribed.7 Endorsement and
delivery of the instrument to the transferee is made mandatory in only two states,
Georgia and Kentucky,' but the transferee and transferor are required to join in an
assignment of the certificate of registration in Iowa and Minnesota? In Georgia and
South Carolina, liens must be shown upon applications for registration, but no
further provisions for noting the lien upon the registration certificate, pointing out
the intended connection with other filing statutes, or describing the general effect of
such procedure, are to be found.' ° Therefore, it will be observed that the registra-
tion laws do not, in terms, comprehend a method whereby constructive notice of
liens and encumbrances may be imparted through registration or the registration
certificate. Most of the states, however, provide for recording and indexing initial
registrations and transfers, thus indicating that the machinery for centralized filing or
recording is present in every state." In seven of these jurisdictions the registration
certificate must be carried or exhibited in the vehicle, consequently destroying the use-
fulness of the instrument as a document of commerce.' 2
States with certificate of title laws-in general. Certificate of title legislation has
steadily gained in popularity so that at the present time 35 jurisdictions' 8 have
adopted legislation requiring ownership interests in motor vehicles to be cleared
through an official document known as the certificate of title. Like the registration
' None of the statutes expressly provide that the registration receipt or the registration records should
constitute constructive notice to creditors, purchasers, or lienholders. Mississippi requires the transferor
to give a bill of sale, which may be recorded in county records, but the statute says nothing of the
rights of creditors or purchasers.
'See e.g., Bolton-Swanby Co. v. Owens, 2o Minn. 162, 275 N. W. 855, 857 (1937); 22 MINN. L.
REV. 720 (1938).
a All of the states except Massachusetts have general provisions accomplishing this result. See statutes
cited Appendix I, col. I. In Massachusetts a motor vehicle may be registered in the name of the
conditional seller. Temple v. Middlesex & B. St. Ry., 241 Mass. 124, 134 N. E. 641 (1922).
'Alabama, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshirq, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
and Vermont have such provisions. See App. i, col. 2. In some states, a non-resident applicant
for registration must furnish the certificate of title held under the laws of another state. E.g., Ky. REv.
STAT. §186.020 (c-d) (1948); MINN. STAT. §168.13 (1949).
'See App. 1, cOl. 3.
' See App. 1, col. 3.
'°GA. CODE ANN. §68-207 (1937); S. C. ConE ANN. §5894(17) (Supp. 1949).
"In Direct Mail Service v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 296 Mass. 353, 5 N. E.2d 545 (i937), the
Registrar of Motor Vehicles was compelled by mandamus to permit inspection and the making of
copies of the registration records.
"2 But cf. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Dassenko, 43 N. W.2d 299 (N. D. 1950) (custom and usage
of dealers to use certificate in obtaining loans).
" See Apps. 2-3.
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statutes in the other states, title certificate laws require owners of motor vehicles
to comply with annual registration laws, but to facilitate the tracing of title,
acquisition of a separate certificate of title is made mandatory. Consequently perma-
nent title records, separate and apart from the registration machinery, as a matter of
administrative routine facilitate the collection of permanent title data on each motor
vehicle.
The structure of these laws roughly adheres to a uniform pattern. However, it
is convenient to classify the statutes upon the basis of the comprehensiveness with
which the legislatures have undertaken to vest the certificate of title with conclusive-
ness of all ownership interests. In nine states,14 the laws reflect a rather cursory effort
to include lien or security interests within the group of ownership interests which
may be registered upon the title certificate. For the purposes of this discussion these
jurisdictions are separately classified as states with "incomplete" certificate of title
laws. The other 26 states,"5 either by specific inclusion or through the comprehensive
character of the legislation, in most cases have manifested a calculated intent to
require that lien interests be perfected through the title certificate machinery. These
will be referred to as states with "comprehensive" certificate of title laws.
States with "incomplete" certificate of title laws. The statutes of Illinois,
Indiana, Maryland, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin ' are modeled after the now obsolete Uniform Motor
Vehicle Anti-Theft Act, which had as its purpose the prevention of theft by regu-
lating transfers of this kind of property.'7  "Owners," who are defined to exclude
lienholders out of possession,' s are required to obtain a certificate of title and assign
the certificate upon transfer to other "owners" who in turn must return the cer-
tificate to a'central motor vehicle department. A record is thus maintained upon each
motor vehicle under the engine serial number and usually the name of the owner, 9
and this record, in turn, is noted upon the new certificate of title. In all of these
states, failure to assign the certificate is penalized by criminal sanctions, but none of
the laws expressly impose civil sanctions by invalidating transfers which do not
comply. 0 Since each successive owner is required to obtain a new certificate of title,
the instrument does not circulate as a "negotiable" document, except as to dealers
who are permitted to re-assign the certificate acquired upon the purchase of used
automobiles.2 In none of these states are dealers required to obtain a certificate of
title for new .vehicles, but in Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, and North Carolina they
" See App. 2. " See App. 3. " See App. 2.
17 Cf. UNIFORM MoToR VEMCLE AwNr-ThFr ACr §6(b), ii U. L. A. 147 (942). This act was
declared obsolete by the Commissioners in 1943. Id. io (Supp. 1949).
"ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 95%, §74(c) (1950); IND. STAT. ANN. §47-2402(0) (Burns Supp. 1949); MD.
AsN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 66%, §2 (31) (Supp. 1947); N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §20-38(t) (Supp.
1949); N. D. Ray. SrAT. §39.0101(22) (I943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §23.1 (Supp. 1949); S.D. Laws
c. 184, p. 222 (1941); W. VA. CODE ANN. §1424 (1949) ("owner" defined to include person holding
"title"); Ws. STAT. §85.10(x6) (1947).
1" See App. 2, col. 7. 0See App. 2, col. 1.
"Indiana is the only state which (apparently) does not permit the dealer to re-assign the certificate
of title without obtaining a new one. See App. 2, col. 5.
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must obtain a manufacturer's certificate of origin which must pass upon transfers 2
The exceptions in favor of the dealer no doubt represent a legislative effort to facili-
tate trade in new and used motor vehicles.F3 Most states provide specially for
transfers effected by legal sales, repossession, or other involuntary proceedings.
4
All of the legislation in these states permits liens existing at the time of transfer
to be shown upon the certificate of title when issued by the state motor vehicle agency.
But the statutes literally do not provide a method for perfecting liens thereon in
absence of a transfer from one "owner" to another.25 None of the laws specify that
the lien instrument must be filed or recorded, define the rights of purchasers and
creditors, indicate the time the lien is to take effect, reconcile the effect of such laws
on local recording statutes, or provide that notation of the lien upon the document
shall constitute constructive notice. However, a legislative intent that the certificate
of title should constitute a source of lien information is indicated in Illinois, Indiana,
North Carolina, and North Dakota where the lienholder is permitted to hold pos-
session of the certificate of title,26 and is compelled to effectuate a release upon the
instrument2 7 In Wisconsin, the certificate must be retained by the person in posses-
sion of the vehicle.
28
States with "comprehensive" certificate of title laws. A legislative scheme to
establish the entire record of property transactions concerning motor vehicles is indi-
cated, though in various degrees of conclusiveness, by the tide certificate laws in 26
states, including Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. 9 Like the statutes of the other
certificate of tide states, these statutes require "owners"a to obtain a certificate of
tide as a condition precedent to registration or operation upon the highways, and to
assign it upon transfer to other "owners" who must apply for and receive a certificate
of title. Some of the statutes invalidate transfers which do not comply by imposing
22 See App. 2, cOl. 5.
23 It will be observed that in those states which- do not require the dealer in new motor vehicles
either to have a manufacturer's certificate or obtain a certificate of title, the certificate cannot constitute a
valuable source of constructive notice to third persons.
24 See App. 2, col. 9. 2 See App. 2, col. 2. 21 See App. 2, col. 4.
2' See App. 2, col. 6. (Maryland also is included in this group.)
2' See App. 2, col. 4. 29 See App. 3.
°in most states "owner" is defined to mean a mortgagor or conditional buyer with a right of
possession. ARiz. CODE ANN. §66-401 (Supp. 1949); A~xe. DIG. STAT. §75-II1(b) (Supp. 1949); CAL. VE-
HICLE CODE §§66-68 (948); COLO. STAT. ANN. C. I6, §76(q) (935); DEL. REv. CODE §5539(q) (1935);
D. C. CODE §40-101(c) (940); FLA. STAT. ANN. §317.01 (4) (949); IDAHO CODE ANN. §49-401(e)
(Supp. 1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §8-i2 6(n) (Supp. 1947); LA. REv. STAT. §47:451(26) (1950);
Mich. Acts 1949, c. 300, §257.37; Mo. Laws 1945, P. 1196, §8367; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §53-133 (f)
(1947); NEv. Coitp. LAws §4435(q) (Sutpp. I941); N. M. STAT. ANN. §68-xoi(e) (1941); ORE. COaP.
LAws §§si5-ioi (25-26) (Supp. 1943); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §2 (Supp. 1949); TENN. CODE ANN.
§5538.10 (Williams Supp. 1949); TEx. ST T., PENAL CODE art. 1436 -I, §4 (948); Utah Laws 1935, c.
46, §57-3a-i(u); VA. CODE ANN. §46-1(15) (950); WsA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§6312-1(e), (z) (Supp.
1943); WYo. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§6o-ioi(io), 60-201(e) ('945); cf. NEB. REV. STAT. §6o-50o(8) (Supp.
1949) ("safety responsibility" law); N. J. STAT. ANN. §39:10-2 (Supp. 1950) ("buyer," "purchaser," and
"contract" defined to accomplish same result). Ohio has no definition provision directly applicable.
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civil sanctions. Unfortunately, these laws do not describe the effect of non-com-
pliance with respect to the rights of third persons, but instead either declare the
transfer "void," or in other language prohibit the courts from giving effect to the
transaction. In all, twelve states have such provisions, including California, Colo-
rado, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Texas, and Utah.31 Most of the remaining jurisdictions merely impose penal
sanctions upon the parties where the certificate of tide is not properly assigned and
entered upon the records of the vehicle department 2 Upon transfer of used motor
vehicles, most of the laws permit dealers to re-assign the certificate of title without
applying for and obtaining a certificate in the dealer's name3 Usefulness of the
certificate of tide in financing dealers upon the security of new motor vehicles is
doubtful in a majority of the states where manufacturers are not required to furnish
a manufacturer's certificate, or the dealer is not otherwise required to obtain or
furnish a certificate of title to purchasers of new automobiles.34 Only in Arizona,
Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, and Texas are dealers required to acquire, and transfer,
a certificate from the manufacturer. As in the case of the other title laws, most
statutes purport to govern procedure for involuntary transfers.'
Most of the states with comprehensive legislation have adopted elaborate pro-
visions for noting liens upon the certificate of tide and the records of the central
department charged with administration of the law. 0 With the exception of New
Jersey, a means is clearly provided for perfecting liens upon the certificate either at
the time of transfer or thereafter as a separate transaction 7  The lien instrument
must be either filed or recorded in all these jurisdictions other than California,
Florida, Kansas, Michigan, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia, and Washington, where the information is stated upon the appropriate
application3 s In some states, including Colorado,3" Nebraska,4" Ohio,41 and Wy-
oming, the procedure is that liens are noted upon the certificate by local agents
and transmitted by them to the central department. In Missouri liens must be
recorded locally, and, except upon transfer, there is no special provision for centralized
recording of such liens 3
"x See App. 3, col. I. "2 See App. 3, col. I.
" New Jersey and Ohio require the dealer to acquire a new tide. The District of Columbia has no
express provision applying to dealers. See App. 3, col. 9.
"Upon the sale of new vehicles most states require the dealer to give a bill of sale or join in an
application for the certificate with the transferee. Many states require the dealer to notify the department
of transfers, and in a few states the department must be notified of acquisitions. In the District of Colum-
bia and Nevada, the law is not dear as to whether a dealer is required to obtain a certificate of title for
new vehicles. See App. 3, col. 9. In Nevada a certificate of title is required as a condition to registra-
tion. NEv. Comp,. LAws §4435.09 (Supp. 1949). Registration is not required by dealers upon stock in
trade. Id. §4435.15 (Supp. 1941). Consequently, it appears that the dealer need not acquire a certificate
of title to new vehicles. In the District of Columbia a certificate is required by regulations. Fogle v.
General Credit, Inc., 122 F.2d 45, n. 6 (D. C. Cir. 1941).
"See App. 3, cOl. i4. " See App. 3.
5TSee App. 3, cOl. 2. "' See App. 3, cOl. 3.
CoLo. SrAT. ANN. c. 16 , §r3 (r9-21) (Supp. 1949).
"NEB. REv. STAT. §6o-ixo (1943). "Omo CoDE ANN. §6290.9 (Supp. 1949).
,WVyo. Coms. STAT. ANN. §§6o-2o6, 60-2O8(f) (Supp. x949).
"'Mo. Laws 1941, p. 328, §3488.
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That the certificate of tide laws were intended to supersede local filing provisions
is clearly expressed in all the states, other than Kansas, Michigan, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wyoming, where specific language
to that effect was not found." Louisiana and Missouri are the only jurisdictions,
however, which affirmatively require recording in accordance with other statutes.45
Language of the laws usually purports to include all "liens and encumbrances,"
although mortgages and conditional sales are customarily named.4 Trust receipts
are specifically encompassed by the acts of Florida, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio,
Tennessee, and Texas but excluded by the California and Missouri statutes.4 7
Compliance with the certificate of tide legislation is not required of persons claim-
ing by pledge or possessory lien in Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, District of Co-
lumbia, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Utah,48 and liens upon accessories are gov-
erned by the statutes in Michigan and Montana4
Lack of uniformity distinguishes these laws with respect to constructive notice
against third persons. Most of the enactments with specific provisions upon the
subject fix the effective date of liens at the time of application, filing, or when the
lien is noted upon the certificate by the proper officer.80 None of the statutes ex-
pressly state that possession of the certificate, alone and without formal compliance,
is sufficient to constitute constructive notice.51 However, the importance of the
document itself in manifesting the rights of lien claimants is recognized by provisions
which give the lienholder a right to retain possession of the certificate,52 and upon
discharge require its return to the lien-debtor.53 The tide certificate laws present an
unwholesome illustration of poor legislative draftsmanship in defining the specific
rights of third persons where the lien is not properly perfected.5 4 Six states, Kansas,
Michigan, New Jersey, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming, altogether fail to men-
tion the rights of third parties. Predominantly, the statutes protect "creditors, sub-
sequent purchasers and lienholders," where the lien is not properly registered through
the certificate of tide. A summary of the general confusion, at best, deserves foot-
note space. 5 However, this general deficiency should furnish no serious obstacle in
"See App. 3, col. 6. " S= App. 3, col. 6. "See App. 3, col. 7.
'T See App. 3, col. 7. The Virginia Traders' Act is expressly superseded by the certificate of title law.
VA. CoDE ANN. §46-7x (1950). In those states where the deoler is not required to obtain a certificate
of title or manufacturer's certificate for a new vehicle, it is doubtful that floor plan financing can be
accomplished through this instrument. E.g., Axu. Din. STAT. §§75-i6o(a), 75-132(1) (Supp. 1949)
(lien provisions apply only to vehicles required to be registered); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §8-135(2) (Supp.
1947) (where certificate assigned to dealer, it is "deemed dormant" until re-transfer by him); VA. CoDE
ANN. §46-io6 (195o) (certificate of tide not required of dealer upon new vehicles). In Louisiana, floor
plan loans upon new vehicles are perfected by filing with Collector of Revenue, and without obtaining a
certificate of tide. La. Acts 1950, No. 342, §13(b).
"'See App. 3, col. 7. "' See App. 3, col. 7. o See App. 3, col. 4.
r' But cf. D. C. Cona §40-703 (1940). See App. 3, col. 8.
"
5 See App. 3, col 1o. Elven of the twenty-six states authorize assignments of the lienholder's
interest to be registered upon the certificate of title. See App. 3, col. II.
"'See App. 3, col. 5.
" Creditors: Most of the statutes provide generally that registration upon the certificate of title is
constructive notice to "creditors." Arizona, California, Montana, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas,
and Virginia. Others apply to creditors with or without process. Delaware, Florida, Nebraska, and
Ohio. Two statutes apply to creditors without notice. Colorado and Idaho. Others are limited to lien
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statutory construction, because the general filing or recording laws stand in pari
materia.56
II
REGISTRATION STATUTES AS IMPARTING CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OP LIENS
As pointed out, most of the registration statutes do not provide the necessary
mechanics for showing of liens through the registration certificate."' None provide
that either the registration records5 or the registration certificate shall constitute
constructive notice of liens against creditors, subsequent purchasers, or lienholders.
In many of the states, transferees are not required to obtain an endorsement of the
certificate. Consequently, where the interests of lienholders appear upon the regis-
tration receipt, purchasers, lienholders, and creditors should comply with and
receive the protection accorded by the general recording or filing laws, 0 except
to the extent that notice of the lienholder's interest shown upon the certificate is
affirmatively called to the attention of third paries60 The precise effect of
the statutes in Georgia and South Carolina, which anticipate that liens may be
shown upon the registration receipt,61 must remain inconclusive until the matter
is settled by case law. It is extremely questionable, however, that these statutes, in-
complete as they are, were intended to supersede the general recording statutes.
Upon estoppel principles, however, it is reasonable to suppose that liens registered
upon the certificate in these states without local filing, may be effective against third
persons who actually see the lien upon the certificate before purchasing or extending
credit upon the lien-debtor's apparent ownership.
creditors. Arkansas and New Mexico. And still another to lien creditors without notice. Utah.
Purchasers: The bulk of the statutes are directed against "subsequent purchasers or lienholders."
Arizona, California, Florida, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and
Virginia. Two statutes apply to such persons without notice. Idaho and Utah. And others include
purchasers for "value." Colorado and New Mexico. In Arkansas the statute protects purchasers "with
or without notice." "Good faith" lienholders are protected by the New Mexico statute.
"o In Louisiana and Missouri the effect upon third persons of failure to comply with the title law is
determined by the general recording statutes. La. Acts 195o, No. 342, §13; Mo. Laws 1941, p. 328, §3488.
"
5 See App. i.
" In some states the statutes specifically require the registration records to show the name of the
owner and serial number of the vehicle. IowA CoDE §32131 (950) (numerical and motor number file);
ME. REv. STAT. C. 19, §13 (1944) (under serial number and name of owner); MINN. STAT. §168.33(3)
(949) (registered under name of owner, make, and serial number); N. Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIc LAW
§11(2) (1941) (registered under name of owner and engine number). However, registration records
are usually maintained upon a yearly basis only, and therefore provide a poor substitute for imparting
constructive notice of the whole chain of title transfers. E.g., Ky. Rrv. STAT. §186.240(2) (948)
("numerical record" of registration numbers, only).
"Kurtz v. Adrian, 46 S. D. 125, 191 N. W. i88 (1922) (mortgagee-seller who failed to record
mortgage but kept registration in his own name defeated by subsequent bona fide purchaser from
mortgagor); cf. Clanton v. Thigpen, 226 S. W.2d 85o (Tex. Civ. App. 195o); Union Bank & Trust Co.
v. Willey, 237 Iowa 1250, 24 N. W.2d 796 (1946); Cerex Co. v. Peterson, 203 Iowa 355, 212 N. W.
89o (1927) (bill of sale given by N1 to E and recorded-held valid against creditors although no transfer
of registration).
" Cf. Nelson v. Fisch, 39 N. W.2d 594 (Iowa 1949) (where certificate of title obtained in Nebraska
was attached to bad check, and Iowa buyer purchased with notice that seller did not have title certificate);
see Rice Street Motors v. Smith, 167 Pa. Super. 159, 74 A.2d 535, 537 (x95o) (court held that Minnesota
registration certificate was indicium of ownership, and said that New York receipt was not).
" See App. 1, col. 4.
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To lenders and purchasers of motor vehicles the principal value of the registra-
tion receipt will be found in its limited usefulness for checking tide.62 In those
states where the registration receipt must be assigned upon the transfer of "owner-
ship"63 third persons may be justified in relying upon the appearance of "ownership"
created where both possession and a clear registration certificate are in the hands of
one other than the real owner. 4 Here the elements of estoppel combine to give the
registration certificate an appearance of reliability, except, of course, as to security
interests 5 which are excluded from the statutes requiring transfer of registration,
and which are governed by the notice provisions of the recording acts. On the other
hand, registration in the name of one other than the transferor may be sufficient to
require further title investigation by a transferee who must qualify as a good faith
purchaser 6
The uncertainty of the extent to which estoppel will shield third persons in such
cases is illustrated by two recent decisions arising out of the fraudulent conduct of a
Cf i. Kirk v. Madsen, 36 N. W.ad 757 (Iowa 1949). "' App. i, col. 3.
04 Possession plus the certificate of registration alone has been held sufficient to create an estoppel.
Bailey v. Hoover, 233 Ky. 681, 26 S. W.2d 522 (1930); see Moore v. Wilson, 230 Ky. 49, 18 S. W.2d 873,
874-5 (1929). Possession plus the certificate of title in a dealer may create an estoppel. Cf. Armstrong
v. Boomansour, 223 App. Div. 511, 228 N. Y. Supp. 722 (4 th Dep't 1928), afl'd mem., 252 N. Y. 59o,
170 N. E. 155 (x929); Ross v. Leuci, 194 Misc. 345, 85 N. Y. S.2d 497 (N. Y. City Ct. 1949). A good
faith purchaser from a seller in possession and with registration in his name has been protected against
the claims of the buyer. Davis v. Grossman, 201 Minn. 156, 275 N. W. 858 (937); Armstrong v.
Boomansour, supra; cf. Moore v. Wilson, supra. A purchaser from one who has obtained title by fraud
will find reliance upon the certificate of registration to be persuasive evidence of good faith. Cf. White
v. Pike, 36 N. W.2d 761 (Iowa 1949) (Iowa buyer taking assigned Nebraska certificate of title from
one who had obtained vehicle by bad check prevailed over owner); Blount v. Bainbridge, 79 Ga. App. 99,
53 S. E.2d 122 (1949). The courts have shown disinclination to protect the purchaser upon the strength
of a forged registration. Cadwallader v. Clifton R. Shaw, Inc., 127 Me. 172, 142 At. 580 (1928) (bailee
obtained registration in his name without authority from bailor); Royle v. Worcester Buick Co., 243 Mass.
143, 137 N. E. 531 (1922) (agent authorized to receive offers forged principal's name on registration
certificate); cf. American Surety Co. of N. Y. v. Boden, 243 Ky. 8o5, 5o S. W.2d 1o (x932) (owner gave
agent possession with signed, blank bill of sale to be notarized when agent sold vehicle, but agent caused
signature to be notarized-held that purchaser from agent could recover damages from notary). In
Moberg v. Commercial Credit Corp., 42 N. W.2d 54 (Minn. 1950), the court refused to estop the owner
against a bank which loaned upon the strength of a certificate assigned in blank to a dealer, partly upon
the ground that this method of assignment was not authorized by the registration statute requiring both
parties to join in a transfer. Creditors cannot claim an estoppel upon the ground that one in possession
holds a certificate of registration unless credit is furnished upon the strength of the apparent ownership.
Bolton-Swanby Co. v. Owens, 201 Minn. 162, 275 N. W. 855 (1937); Bosen v. Larrabee, 91 N. H. 492,
23 A.2d 331 (194) (sheriff had notice of owner's claim before creditor obtained lien); cf. Cerex Co.
v. Peterson, 203 Iowa 355, 212 N. W. 89o (1927).
" This point is made beautifully by the case of Associates Discount Corporation v. Davis Motor Sales,
275 App. Div. 745, 87 N. Y. S. 2d 757 (4 th Dep't 1949). There a dealer sold an automobile to H,
who signed a conditional sale contract. A bill of sale, however, was given by the dealer to W, who in
turn sold to a dealer upon a clear registration certificate. The assignece of the dealer's contract prevailed
over W's purchaser on the ground that the conditional sale records constituted the exclusive source of lien
information. Quaere: Are the registration records to be construed with the chattel mortgage records to
determine the chain of "ownership"? Cf. Personal Finance Co. of Hammond v. Flecknoe, 216 Ind. 330,
340, 24 N. E.2d 694, 698 (1940) (court indicated that registration certificate provided necessary informa-
tion for discovering name and address of owner, which in turn would lead to proper lien records).
" Cf. Personal Finance Co. v. Flecknoe, 216 Ind. 330, 340, 24 N. E.ad 694, 698 (1940); Nelson v.
Fisch, 39 N. W.2d 594 (Iowa 1949). But cf. Blount v. Bainbridge, 79 Ga. App. 99, 53 S. E.zd 122
(1949) (registration disregarded in finding estoppel against one who sold automobile in exchange for bad
check).
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Minnesota used car dealer doing business near the Minnesota-North Dakota border.
In each of these controversies an owner turned over his automobile to the dealer with
the certificate of registration signed in blank, but upon the understanding that the
dealer would be paid a commission if the vehicle were sold. The dealer, however,
took the registration certificates to his bank and received a loan upon the security
of the vehicles. In Commercial Credit Corporation v. Dassenko 7 the North Dakota
Supreme Court allowed the bank to prevail over the owner, chiefly upon the ground
that reliance was justifiably founded upon the certificate of registration. The Min-
nesota case of Moberg v. Commercial Credit Corporation"s held to the contrary,
recognizing with reluctance the possibility of an estoppel, but refusing to find one on
the ground that the evidence showed that the bank did not see the registration
certificate until after the loan had been made. Since reliance constitutes an essential
element of estoppel, the decisions can be reconciled. However, the Moberg decision
clearly establishes the fact that the registration laws do not impart constructive notice
of title interests.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code. Clearly, the Commercial Code will not
modify the present statutes in the fourteen states with registration laws. In recog-
nizing that security interests in motor vehicles may be perfected through a title instru-
ment, the Code in terms is restricted to those states with "certificates of title" and
allowing "all liens" to be registered under such laws.69 The registration statutes meet
neither of these requirements. Only by a stretch of the imagination would the
statutes of Georgia and South Carolina come within its language. In common ac-
ceptation the "registration" laws of these states do not provide for a separate title
instrument usually required in the "title certificate" states. Nor do these statutes
furnish the necessary machinery for noting "all liens" upon the certificate, in view
of the fact that the statutes provide only for the registration of liens existing at the
time ownership is transferred.
Changes effectuated by the Code with respect to the operation of existing registra-
tion laws will, if at all, be indirect. By imposing "an obligation of good faith"7 in
the performance of contracts encompassed by the law, it is reasonable to suppose that
the Code will expand the general principles of estoppel in relation to the registration
certificate.71 Comment of the Editors recognizes that the acquisition of a "certificate
of title," in those states with laws which "aim" at establishing an exclusive means of
title evidence, becomes a part of what is statutorily required to satisfy "the course
of trade" in so far as good faith dealing is imposed upon those dealing professionally
with such commodity. 2 Whether this provision will be applied to the registration
6 43 N. V.2d 299 (N. D. 1950). as 42 N. W.2d 54 (Minn. i95o).
"U. C. C. §9-402 (Sept. 1950).
"0 "Every contract within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance." U. C. C.
§1-203 (Spring 1950).
7 The Code retains existing principles of estoppel. U. C. C. §1-103 (Spring i95o).
'2 "As far as third parties are involved, the acquisition of a proper 'certificate of title' becomes a part
of what is statutorily required to satisfy the 'course of trade' within the meaning of the section on good
faith purchase of goods." U. C. C. §1-203, comments 1, 2 (Spring 595o).
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certificate is not made clear, but presumably the purpose of this section is to require
of dealers compliance with regulatory statutes which serve a beneficial commercial
purpose to the public. The statutes in Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, and Minnesota tend
to make the registration receipt a valuable source of tide evidence to transferees of
"ownership" interests, who must obtain or sign the registration certificate.73 There-
fore, the way is left open for the courts to impose civil sanctions upon dealers who
fail to comply under the "good faith" provisions of the Code. This may mean that
dealers must take affirmative measures to determine non-security ownership interests
reflected upon the registration certificate.74  This may mean, too, that in Georgia 75
lien-sellers must perfect lien interests upon the registration certificate to the extent
that failure of the instrument to show such liens will create an estoppel in favor of
third persons who rely upon an unencumbered receipt.
III
EFFECT OF TITLE CERTIFICATE LAws ON GENERAL STATUTES
PROVIDING FOR RECORDATION OF LIENS
The general problem. A common misunderstanding of the tide certificate laws
has been the general belief that the effect of such legislation is to make the certificate
the sole muniment of ownership.76 This the statutes have not done7" either by
express provision or by judicial decision, although it may not be unreasonable to
suggest that the case law is pointing in that direction.7 8  However, the importance
of the title certificate as a conduit of title has been recognized in a number of de-
cisions where the document has figured prominently in matters of estoppel. Estoppel
may occur in many different ways, but speaking generally, an estoppel arises where
the owner entrusts possession to another under circumstances creating an appearance
of ownership. Third persons who justifiably rely upon this combination of events
may be protected where the person in possession has exceeded the boundaries of his
particular ownership interest.
The estoppel situation customarily makes its appearance in business transactions
(I) where the owner (in those obscure cases which the law, for one reason or
"See App. 1, cols. 2, 3.
Cf. Kirk v. Madsen, 36 N. W.2d 757 (Iowa 1949) (purchase of out-of-state automobile by used
car dealer without certificate of title showed lack of good faith); Eline v. Commercial Credit Corp.,
307 Ky. 77, 209 S. W.2d 846 0948) (dealer-buyer required to examine county registration records
showing out-of-state certificate of title with encumbrance); Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Devonshire
Financial Service Corp., 53 R. I. 443, 167 Ati. 134 (1933) (bank loaning upon stock in trade denied
right to estoppel where no title investigation). Quaere: Whether professional lenders (who are not
required to demand the registration receipt) would be required to inspect the instrument under the Code?
But cf. Moberg v. Commercial Credit Corp., 42 N. W.2d 54 (Minn. x95o).
7' This conclusion is drawn from the provisions of the Georgia statute requiring delivery of a certificate
of registration upon transfer, and authorizing liens at time of transfer to be registered. While liens may be
registered in South Carolina, the statute does not require endorsement of the registration receipt upon
transfer.
" Cf. Comment, X Comparison of Land and Motor Vehicle Registration, 48 YALE L. J. 1238 (1939).
"E.g., Bank of America Nat. T. & Say. Ass'n v. National Funding Corp., 45 Cal. App.2d 320, 114
P.2d 49, 54-55 (194)
" Cf. Rigney v. Swingley, IX2 Mont. 104, 113 P.2d 344 (1941) (mortgage outside chain of title
invalid against subsequent purchaser).
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another, has failed to characterize as a "sale," "conditional sale," or "lien" within
the meaning of recording laws) entrusts possession of goods to one engaged in the
business of selling or dealing in that type of commodity;"0 (2) where the seller
retains possession after title passes; 0 (3) where title and possession are obtained as
the result of fraud;"' and, (4) where one obtains tide under a resulting or express
trust. 2 In each of these transactions a bona fide purchaser from the intermediate
party in possession is usually protectedYs  However, in the first transaction the
decisions have shown a tendency to protect only the buyer in ordinary course of
trade unless other factors are present to indicate a broader power8 4 In all of these
7 E.g., W. P. Fuller & Co. v. Adams, 97 Wash. 254, x66 Pac. 623 (1917). It is perhaps inaccurate
to conclude that the mere entrusting of possession to one who deals in, or sells goods of that type will
give rise to an estoppel. s WILLISTON, SALES §314 (2d ed. 1924). But ci. U. C. C. §2-403 (Spring
195o). Possession coupled with a bill of sale has been held sufficient to create an estoppel. Bailey v.
Hoover, 233 Ky. 681, 26 S. W.2d 522 (1930). But cf. Essex County Acceptance Corp. v. Pierce-Arrow
Sales Co., 288 Mass. 270, 192 N. E. 604 (934) (distributor entrusting automobile and invoice marked
"cash on delivery" not estopped against subsequent lienholder upon ground that invoice not marked
"paid").
SO "Where a person having-sold goods continues in possession . .. the delivery or transfeir by that
person . . . to any person receiving and paying value for the same in good faith and without notice of
the previous sale, shall have the same effect as if the person making the delivery or transfer werq
expressly authorized by the owner of the goods to make the same." UNIFOnet SALES ACr §25. No
similar provision is to be found in the Code, except that a buyer in the course of ordinary business is
protected against one who acquiesces in the possession of goods held by a dealer. U. C. C. §2-403(2)
(Spring i95o). Motor vehicle cases dealing with the problem of Section 25 of the Uniform Sales Act:
Armstrong v. Boomansour, 223 App. Div. 511, 228 N. Y. Supp. 722 (4 th Dep't 1922), aLl'd mem., 252
N. Y. 590, 17o N. E. 155 (1929); Sax Motor Co. v. Mann, 71 N. D. 221, 299 N. W. 691 ('941); C/.
Kruse v. Carey, 259 Mich. 157, 242 N. NV. 873 (1932) (involving rights of creditors).8
' As a matter of business experience estoppel of this sort is most commonly invoked where an owner
is duped into selling property upon a bad check. See Blount v. Bainbridge, 79 Ga. App. 99, 53 S. E.ad
122 (949) ("fly-by-night dealer" gave bad check); White v. Pike, 36 N. ',V.zd 761 (Iowa x949)
(professional forger passed printed check taken in burglary). In the title certificate states, the seller can
guard against bad checks by attaching the endorsed title certificate to the check. Kirk v. Madsen, 36
N. W.2d 757 (Iowa 1949); Nelson v. Fisch, 39 N. W.2d 594 (Iowa 1949). The Commercial Code
repudiates the rule in some states which treats the bad check sale as a "cash sale," thus protecting good
faith purchasers in all eases where possession has passed. Compare U. C. C. §2-401(1) (Spring 1950)
with Young v. Harris-Cortner Co., 152 Tenn. 15, 268 S. W. 125 (1924).
In some states the owner who has been dispossessed of his property under circumstances amounting
to common law larceny may reclaim possession from a bona fide purchaser. L. W. Sweet & Co. v.
Provident Loan Soc'y of N. Y., 279 N. Y. 540, x8 N. E.2d 847 (1939); Deferred Payment Plan, Inc.
v. Bennett, 263 App. Div. 694, 35 N. Y. S.2d 159 (3d Dep't 1942) (owner induced to part with auto-
mobile and assign registration in blank as the result of larceny by trick). The Commercial Code re-
pudiates this technical rule where goods are entrusted to a person who deals in goods of that kind.
U. C. C. §2-403(3) (Spring, i95o).82Express trusts: 4 BoGERT, TRUSTs AND TRUSTEES §881 (948). Resulting trusts: 2 id. §466 (935).
For cases involving automobiles, see Lynn v. Herman, 72 Cal. App.2d 614, 165 P.2d 54 (1946) (com-
munity property); Willard H. George, Ltd. v. Barnett, 65 Cal. App.2d 828, 150 P.ad 591 (1944); Mary-
land Casualty Co. v. Hollman, 1oo Cal. App. 669, 280 Pac. 1034 (1929); National Fire Ins. Co. v.
Collingsworth, 288 Ky. 398, 156 S. W.2d 157 ('94'); Davis v. Grossman, 201 Minn. 156, 275 N. W.
858 (i937); Rigney v. Swingley, 112 Mont. 104, 113 P.2d 344 (194i); Associates Discount Corp. v.
Davis Motor Sales, 275 App. Div. 745, 87 N. Y. S.2d 757 (4 th Dep't 1949); Majors v. Majors, 349 Pa.
334, 37 A."d 528 (944).
Z' See notes 80-82 supra.
8'E.g., Tropical State Bank v. Sunshine Motor Co., 137 Fla. 703, x88 So. 595 (1939) (consignment
of automobiles on common-law trust receipt to dealer did not empower him to mortgage property);
Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Milwaukee Cold Storage Co., 173 Wis. 87, i8o N. W. 256 (1920) (commission
agent selling meat had no power to encumber property in his possession); Harrison v. Auto Securities Co.,
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cases the rights of creditors against the party in possession vary greatly within the
jurisdictions and from state to state 5 Unless the state has a factors' act, none of
these situations clearly fall within the filing or recording statutes8 6 And seldom, if
ever, does the unwitting owner, who finds himself faced with estoppel, think in
terms of recording or filing.
The motor vehicle certificate of title laws have cut deeply into some of these
general principles, and have added some others. Unlike recording and filing acts
70 Utah I1, 257 Pac. 677 (1927) (buyer from dealer-agent in regular course of business prevailed over
finance company holding a lien on vehicle repossessed by dealer). The principle by which a purchaser in
ordinary course of trade prevails against an owner who has entrusted possession to a dealer cuts a wide
swath in the law. It is imposed against conditional sellers. UNIFORM CONDMTIONAL SALES ACT §9. A
chattel mortgagee holding a lien upon inventory will be defeated by a purchaser in regular course of
business. E.g., Helms v. American Security Co., 216 Ind. 1, 22 N. E.2d 822 (1939). Likewise in the
case of trust receipts. UNIFORm TRusT REcEsPrs Acr §9.
" Dealer in possession. In the absence of legislation, the consignor usually prevails over creditors of the
consignee. 2 GARsARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §537 (Rev. ed. 194o). Aside
from factoring, however, estoppel constitutes the basis of the law of fraudulent conveyances based upon
"reputed ownership." s id. §343; W. P. Fuller & Co. v. Adams, 97 Wash. 254, i66 Pac. 623 (1917)
(mother leaving son in possession of machinery used in manufacturing business estopped against claims
of creditors); Frick Co. v. Walter Cox Co., iox Ind. App. 402, i99 N. E. 462 (1936) (principal of
factor with unlimited power of sale and no duty to account for proceeds estopped against creditors).
Seller in possession. In most states creditors who advance credit in reliance upon the seller's apparent
ownership, and who become lien creditors before the buyer takes possession, prevail over the latter. i
GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES C. 19 (Rev. ed. 1940); cf. Kruse v. Carey, 259
Mich. 157, 242 N. W. 873 (1932). Like the prior Uniform Sales Act, the Commercial Code leaves the
rights of creditors of the seller to be determined by local law, except that retention of possession "in good
faith and current course of trade by a merchant-seller for a commercially reasonable time" is not fraudu-
lent. U. C. C. §2-402 (Spring 595o).
Possession obtained by fraud. The owner is usually permitted to prevail against creditors of one who
has obtained tide and possession by fraud. E.g., California Conserving Co. v. D'Avanzo, 62 F.2d 528
(2d Cir. 1933); cf. Federal Building Co. v. Ford Motor Co., ioi Ind. App. 286, i99 N. E. 163 (1936)
(manufacturer who delivered automobiles and invoices marked "paid" upon a bad check of dealer not
estopped against subsequent creditor claiming an "equitable" lien); U. C. C. §2-702 (Spring, 1950)
(recognizing right of reclamation by seller where buyer has misrepresented solvency in writing within
three months before delivery).
Resulting or express trust. Creditors of the trustee, as a general rule, will prevail only where other
elements of estoppel are present. i BOGERT, TRuST AND TRUSTEES §146 (1935); 2 id. §466; Willard H.
George, Ltd. v. Barnett, 65 Cal. App.2d 828, 150 P.2d 591 (1944) (mother took title of daughter's
vehicle in her name-creditors of mother who did not grant credit on strength of title defeated by claim
of daughter); Bolton-Swanby Co. v. Owens, 201 Minn. 162, 275 N. W 855 (937) (bailee's creditors
could not claim estoppel where automobile registered in bailee's name, since claims arose before registra-
tion); Bosen v. Larrabee, 91 N. H. 492, 23 A.2d 331 (941) (owner prevailed against creditor of bailee
in whose name vehide registered, on ground that creditor was notified of ownership before levy); Majors
v. Majors, 349 Pa. 334, 37 A.2d 528 (1944).
0 Sandack v. Tamme, 182 F.2d 759 (ioth Cir. 1950). Twenty-one states have adopted factors' acts
which are variously limited in scope, and chiefly directed to the protection of the lien of the factor out of
possession. Silverman, Factoring: Its Legal Aspects and Economic Justification, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
592 (1948) (statutory provisions charted at pp. 602-603); Note, An Examination of the Minnesota Factor's
Lien Act, 34 MINN. L. Riv. I19 (1950). In Virginia, the Traders' Act does not apply to liens perfected
upon a certificate of title. VA. CODE ANN. §46-71 (950); Universal Credit Co. v. Botetourt Motor Co.,
i8o Va. 159, 21 S. E.2d 8oo (1942). In Royle v. Worcester Buick Co., 243 Mass. 143, 137 N. E. 531
(1922) the New York Factors' Act was not applied to an agent in possession of his principal's motor
vehicle with authority to solicit offers, on the ground that he was not authorized to make a sale.
Several states (Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, and Washington) have statutes permitting recording of the
buyer's contract where the seller is left in possession. i WILLSrON, SALES §§368, 370, 373, 401 (2d ed.
1924); Cerex v. Peterson, 203 Iowa 355, 212 N. W. 89o (1927); Fields-Watkins Co. v. Hensley, 1r7 Va.
66t, 86 S. E. ii3 (915).
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which permit only liens to be shown upon the public records, these statutes anticipate
a showing of the final link in the whole chain of transfers relating to each motor
vehicle. Unfortunately, none of the title laws state in so many words that the
ownership certificate constitutes constructive notice of title interests to third persons.
Though some of the statutes do permit liens to be shown through this instrumentality
and expressly state that such liens constitute constructive notice to third parties,
most statutes merely make non-compliant transfers illegal, or in various ways ex-
press that they are "void." ' In Florida, Idaho, Nebraska, and Ohio, the statutes
literally provide that no interest shall be acquired by estoppel against a person having
possession of the certificate of title 88
In brief, the title certificate laws have had this general effect: (i) Purchasers
who would otherwise qualify to receive the benefits of an estoppel are defeated when
the owner retains the certificate of tide." In other words, acquisition of title in-
terests by estoppel is forbidden because the statutes compel purchasers to obtain an
assignment of the instrument and comply with the tide certificate laws. Some
difficulty arises here, however, because only transferees of "ownership" interests are
literally compelled to comply with such lawsY0 Creditors, 1 and possibly lien-
holders,9 2 do not come within the mandatory direction of the statutes. But since
the title certificate and the title records provide a statutory, common, and reliable
source of tide information, there is no good reason why creditors and lienholders
should not be compelled to consult the records in order to show good faith or
reasonable reliance. (2) Purchasers who otherwise would not qualify to receive the
benefits of an estoppel may do so when the person in possession of the property is
given a clear certificate of title 3 This means, for example, that a bailee in possession
"'See App. 2, col. r; App. 3, col. I. The language of the statutes in several states, however, is
broader. E.g., "No person acquiring a motor vehicle from the owner ... shall acquire any right, tide,
claim, or interest in or to said motor vehicle until he shall have had issued to him a certificate of title ......
Ouo CODE ANN. §6290-4 (I945); FLA. STAT. ANN. §319.22(l) (1949); IDAHO CODE ANN. §49-404 (1948);
NEB. REv. STAT. §6o-xio (1943).
" See App. 3, col. i. Cf. TEx. STAT., PENAL CODE art. 1436 -i, §44 (948). See note 87 supra.
"' Estoppel denied purchaser in regular course of trade who did not get certificate of title: Wilson v.
Mosko, iio Colo. 127, 130 P.2d 927 (1942); Lux v. Lockridge, 65 Idaho 639, X50 P.2d 127 (1944);
cf. Sax Motor Co. v. Mann, 71 N. D. 221, 299 N. W. 691 (94); Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Bandel,
I6o Fla. 925, 37 So.2d 366 (1948). But c. Mason v. Shelton, 292 Ill. App. 640, xx N.E.2d 224 (x937).
Purchaser from one holding possession of vehicle by fraud against owner denied benefit of estoppel
because of failure to acquire certificate: Nelson v. Fisch, 39 N. W.2d 594 (Iowa 1949) (bad check);
Kirk v. Madsen, 36 N. V.2d 757 (Iowa 1949) (bad check); Sims v. Sugg, 165 Kan. 489, 196 P.2d 191
(1948) (bad check); Pearl v. Interstate Securities Co., 357 Mo. i6o, 206 S. W.2d 975 (x947) (bad
check); Wills v. Shepherd, 231 S. W.2d 843 (Mo. App. 195o) (bad check); Deahl v. Thomas, 224 S.
W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
" See notes 18, 30 supra.
"1In re Soss, 52 F. Supp. 123 (D. Del. 1943); Kruse v. Carey, 259 Mich. 157, 242 N. W. 873 (1932).
But cf. Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Feliciano, 32 Cal. App.2d 35X, 89 P.2d 686 (1939).
"Most of the statutes do not in terms require lienholders to perfect the lien upon the certificate as
against prior parties. See App. 3, col. 5. Cf. Peper v. American Exchange Nat. Bank, 357 Mo.
652, 210 S. W.2d 41 (1948); Elder Chevrolet Co. v. Bailey County Motor Co., 15SS. W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941) (subsequent lienholder who did not perfect lien on title prevailed over prior lienholder who
failed to do the same).
"a E.g., Commercial Finance Corp. v. Burke, 173 Ore. 341, 145 P.2d 473 (1944). Creditors, too, may
claim an estoppel when a debtor is put in possession with a proper tide certificate. Majors v. Majors,
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has the power to transfer title to third persons when he holds both an unencumbered
tide certificate and possession of the vehicle, though he ordinarily does not have
such power. 4 To this extent the statutory title instrument gives to him an appear-
ance of ownership which may be relied upon by third parties. In these cases, most
of the decisions hinge upon the presence or absence of the certificate of tide, not
because the instrument serves as constructive notice, but upon the ground of estoppel
created by a statutory standard. Whether a purchaser from one with possession and
the necessary certificate will be protected against the owner when he has not affirma-
tively relied upon the certificate has never been clearly decided, but the tendency
has been to deny estoppel unless the certificate is seen or properly assigned. 5 (3)
The tide certificate is not the sole source of title,96 although both possession of the
vehicle and possession of a properly endorsed certificate of tide combine to create an
estoppel.97  Consequently third persons can rely neither upon possession of the
vehicle alone, nor upon possession of a certificate of title alone, as a basis for claim-
ing estoppel against one who relinquishes possession of one or the other. This
follows from the statutory scheme of the legislation, which is to make the title
certificate a necessary accessory to every motor vehicle. In this respect the tide cer-
tificate serves the purpose of a limited document of title which, like a filed or re-
corded instrument, gives notice of non-possessory title interests only.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code. Without going into detail, it is sufficient
to point out that the sales provisions of the Commercial Code promise to introduce
some new problems into the field of estoppel. The old concept of passage of "tide"
has been broadened. 98 Consignment sales may now qualify as "security interests"
349 Pa. 334, 3 7A.2d 528 (944) (W paid for auto, title to which was taken in H's name--held this
rebutted presumption of resulting trust); cf. Washington Lumber & M. Co. v. McGuire, 213 Cal. 13,
I P.2d 437 (931). But cf. Wargin v. Wargin, 29 Cal.2d 843, 18o P.2d 349 (947) (bill of sale
transferred to mortgagee as owner). However, if the creditor does not advance credit in reliance upon
both possession and the certificate, the owner out of possession will prevail. Willard H. George, Ltd. v.
Barnett, 65 Cal. App.2d 828, 15o P.2d 591 (1944); cf. Bosen v. Larrabem 91 N. H. 492, 23 A.2d 231
(1931) (under registration statute). When grounds for estoppel would otherwise be present, the fact
that the purchaser acquires a clear certificatq of title may play a decisive role in determining the
rights of the parties. Kelsoe v. Krouskay, 7o Ariz. r52, 217 P.2d 915 (949) (bad check); Shockley v.
Hill, 91 Co1. 451, 15 P.2d 623 (932) (bad check); Dresher v. Roy Wilmeth Co., 1i8 Ind. App. 542, 82
N. E.2d 26o (1948) (bad check). However, if possession of the certificate of tide is obtained from the
owner by theft, estoppel will not operate in favor of a third party. Adkisson v. Waitman, 213 P.2d 465
(Okla. 1949) (wife appropriated title assigned in blank); cf. Swartz v. White, 8o Utah 150, 13 P.2d
643 (1932) (purchaser from agent in possession of the vehicle and title assigned in blank did not prevail
over owner, on ground that certificate was not in agent's name).
"
4E.g., Rice v. Galkowski, 333 111. App. 652, 77 N. E.2d 889 (1948).
" Cf. Willard H. George, Ltd. v. Barnett, 65 Cal. App.2d 828, xo P.2d 591 (944); Sims v.
Sugg, 165 Kan. 489, 196 P.2d 191 (1948) (owner defrauded by purchaser who gave bad check prevailed
against third person, although fraudulent purchaser held certificate of title which had not cleared through
motor vehicle agency).
"
8E.g., Henry v. General Forming, Ltd., 33 Cal.d 223, 200 P.2d 785 (1948) (Bx put name on list
for new vehicles and sold his purchase rights to B2-held that creditors of Bi could not reach vehicle
where possession in B2, though tide in Bi). But cf. Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Feliciano, 32 Cal. App.2d
35r, 89 P.2d 686 (i939). In general see cases cited at note 214 infra.07See note 93 supra.
" Principal changes relevant to the discussion here are that (a) reservation by the seller of the tide in
goods delivered or otherwise identified to a contract is limited in effect to "security"; (b) good faith
purchasers from a buyer under a "cash sale" are protected, U. C. C. §2-40(X) (Spring 1950); (c) upon
insolvency, the seller may refuse delivery, except for cash. Id. §2-702.
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within Article 9 of the Code.9 "Buyers in the ordinary course of business" from
one to whom goods have been "entrusted" by "delivery and any acquiescence in re-
tention of possession" are the chief group protected by specific provision for estoppel
in sales transactions. ° But the Code in its general provisions retains the "principles
of law and equity, including . . . estoppel,"'' and imposes "an obligation of good
faith" upon the parties to every contract within its scope. 0 2 Probably the two
most significant changes relevant to the title certificate problem arise out of the
protection afforded "buyers in the ordinary course of business," and the "good faith"
requirement.
Editorial comment to the "good faith" section states: 103
As far as third parties are involved, the acquisition of a proper "certificate of title" becomes
a part of what is statutorily required to satisfy the "course of trade" within the meaning
of the section on good faith purchase of goods.
In literal effect this means that dealers and, perhaps, lending institutions must com-
ply with the tide certificate requirements for protection against both subsequent
and previous parties. Therefore, in so far as "professionals" are concerned, the title
certificate serves as a form of constructive notice of all outstanding interests, since
the "professional" in sales, and probably in security transactions, must deal through
the tide instrument. The policy of this intent seems sound, except for the obscure
way in which it appears. However, it is likely that some of the title certificate laws
are not encompassed within the Article on Secured Transactions, which adopts the
tide certificate machinery as a means for imparting constructive notice of liens.'
These tide certificate laws impose neither civil nor criminal sanctions on transferees
other than those acquiring "ownership" interests which are defined to exclude lien
interests.0 5 Consequently, there may be some doubt whether bankers must examine
the tide certificate before making loans.0 °6 An intent on the part of the Codifiers
to impose this, as a good faith requirement, upon professional lenders is not certain,
because the reference in the Comments is to a statutory standard of good faith.10 7
Existing authority provides no conclusive standard for predicting how the courts will
resolve that doubt.'08
" 'Transactions in the form of consignments or leases may be security transactions subject to this
Article if the understanding of the parties or the effect of tho arrangement shows that a security interest
was intended." U. C. C. §9-102, Comment I (Spring 1950). However, consignment transactions upon
"sale or return" are expressly preseved, but the rights of the seller will be defeated as against the
creditors of the buyer ". . . unless the seller complies with any applicable law requiring a consignor's
interest or the like to be evidenced by a sign or establishes that the buyer is known to be primarily engaged
in selling the goods of others." Id. §2-326. Buyers in the ordinary course of business are protected,
Id. §2-403.
109U. C. C. §2-403 (Spring 1950). ""'U. C. C. §1-103 (Spring 1950).
"'°U. C. C. §1-203 (Spring 1950). ...U. C. C. §1-203, Comment 2 (Spring 195o).
"''U. C. C. §9-402 (Sept. I95o). .. See notes 18, 30 supra.
... See notes, io8 infra, 92 supra. "' U. C. C. §I-2O3, comment 2 (Spring ig5o).
... Compare Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Bandel, 47 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1950) (lending bank charged
with notice of consignor's interest shown by title certificate) with Moberg v. Commercial Credit Corp.,
42 N. W.2d 54 (Minn. i95o) (lending bank not charged with constructive notice of consignor's interest
shown by registration certificate).
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Considerable difficulty stems from the categorical protection given the "buyer in
ordinary course of business" by the Code. °9 The problem may be posed simply.
Suppose 0 entrusts a motor vehicle to D, a dealer in motor vehicles, giving him
authority to solicit offers. 0 sells to B from his lot, but B fails to get the necessary
title papers which are in O's hands. Literally the Code protects the purchaser, B,
unless, of course, the transaction is treated as a "security transaction," which is doubt-
ful."0  This Code result is supported by Commercial Credit Co. v. McNelly,111
a Delaware decision grounded upon the statute in that state which imposed no civil
sanctions upon purchasers who failed to comply. In Colorado, Wilson v. Mosko" 2
reached the opposite conclusion." 3 The policy of the Code is- sound, especially in
view of the deficiency in the title laws which give to dealers broad privileges under
the statutes. 1 4 It is doubtful, however, that the Code provision extends to the casual
customer who leaves a vehicle for repairs with a garageman who also sells used cars,
a situation which arose in Winship v. Standard Finance Company.115
Certificate of title laws as imparting constructive notice of liens. Clarification of
the role of the various tide certificate laws imparting constructive notice of
liens has been only partially achieved by the case law upon the subject. While many
of the states have express provisions to the effect that local filing statutes are super-
seded by tide laws, nearly half of the jurisdictions have left the matter for judicial
settlement which, because of constant legislative revision, is far from conclusive.
The methods by which the lien must be perfected are expressed by technical pro-
visions which require the lien to be enter-d both upon the certificate and the records
of the proper administrative agency. Formal non-compliance has led to considerable
inconsistency in the case law, especially in those cases where the lienholder retains
possession of the instrument, or causes it to be registered in his name as owner.
Uniformity has not been achieved in defining the rights of third persons. And
finally, the decisions have followed a winding path through the literal maze of the
statutory language in defining the security transactions encompassed by the laws,
leaving much confusion, especially in the area of dealer financing.
Effect of title certificate laws on general filing or recording statutes. As previously
pointed out, most of the 26 states with comprehensive tide certificate legislation ex-
plicitly provide that constructive notice of liens must be achieved through the cer-
tificate of title to the exclusion of general filing or recording statutes.P 6 The case
x°U. C. C. §2-403 (Spring 1950).
1 1
°U. C. C. §1-201(36) (Spring 1950).
2216 Harr. 88, 171 Ad. 446 (Del. Super. Ct. 1934).
112 110 Colo. 127, 130 P.2d 927 (1942).
223 For other cases, see note 89 supra.
"' Cf. Nicewarner v. Alston, 228 S. W.2d 872 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (sale between dealers not
governed by statute which did not apply to "first sale"). In general, see App. 2, col. 5; App. 3, col 9.
125 40 Ariz. 382, 12 P.2d 282 (932) (subsequent lienholder who received forged title certificate
defeated).
11' See App. 3, col. 6. The states are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, and Virginia.
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law in these states would appear to have clearly verified this conclusion 1 71  How-
ever, the statutes of Kansas, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Washington, and Wyoming do not verbally purport to repeal the local
recording laws,"' and most of this group also fail to define the rights of third parties
whether or not the liens are properly noted upon the certificate of title."' But
despite this omission, the general comprehensive nature of these laws indicates that
they must have been adopted to accomplish a useful purpose. Since machinery for
recording liens with a central motor vehicle department and noting liens upon the
title instrument is clearly provided, one must strain to suppose that the legislatures
intended to provide two separate places for public notice of liens. Consequently, the
tendency of the courts in these states has been to hold that liens must be shown upon
the title certificate for protection against third parties, and that the local records are
closed to motor vehicle liens?2' A contrary construction was rejected in a very re-
cent Kansas decision, General Acceptance Corporation v. Davis,'' where the claims
of a bona fide purchaser were recognized over a conditional seller who had filed his
lien in the county records but not upon the certificate of title. The court said,
... any person, member of the public generally, or a dealer in used cars, had the right to
purchase from [the conditional buyer] upon satisfying himself that the certificate of title
correctly identified the automobile being purchased, and to rely upon the certificate of title
that there was no lien or encumbrance thereon.
It will be noted, however, that the language of the court is an expression of
"estoppel" rather than of "constructive notice." For this reason, the precise effect
of the legislation in most of these states remains in serious doubt.
Decisions in the states with "incomplete" certificate of title laws, Illinois, Indiana,
Maryland, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wis-
consin, 122 have been inclined to hold that such statutes have had no effect on other
recording requirements.'3 Some support for this position can be found by reasoning
.. E.g., In re Wiegand, 27 F. Supp. 725 (S. D. Cal. 1939); Consumers Credit Co. v. Manifold, 65
Idaho 238, i42 P.2d. 15o (I943); Rigney v. Swingley, 112 Mont. 104, 113 P.2d 344 (941); State v.
Taggart, 133 Ohio 382, 14 N. E.2d io (1938); Christian v. Boyd, 222 S. W.2d x57 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949).
... See App. 3, col. 6.
" The particular rights of third parties are not described in Kansas, Michigan, New Jersey, Oregon,
Washington, and Wyoming. See App. 3, col. 5-
120 Van Syckle v. Keats, 125 N. J. L. 319, 15 A.2d 321 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (conditional seller who per-
fected lien through certificate of title protected without local recording); In re Berlin, 147 F.2d 491
(3d Cir. 1945) (lien perfected on certificate of title valid against trustee in bankruptcy); cf. Daas v.
Contract Purchase Corp., 318 Mich. 348, 28 N. W.2d 226 (947) (purchaser in course of trade who
received clear certificate of tide prevailed over recorded mortgage); Larison-Frees Chevrolet Co. v. Payne,
163 Ore. 276, 96 P.2d io67 (1939) (owner could not pass marketable title where certificate outstanding);
First National Bank v. Sheldon, 16x Pa. Super. 265, 54 A.2d 61 (1947); Automobile Banking Corp.
v. Weicht,. 16o Pa. Super. 422, 51 A.2d 409 (x947).
121 i69 Kan. 220, 218 P.2d 181, 183-184 (1950).
122 See App. 2.
12. Nelson v. Viergiver, 230 Mich. 38, 203 N. W. 164 (1925) (mortgage shown on tide, but not
recorded); General Credit Corp. v. Lee James, Inc., 8 Wash.2d 185, 111 P.2d 762 (1941) (mortgagee who
failed to obtain possession of certificate prevailed over prior mortgagee holding certificate of title); cl.
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that if the legislature intended to provide a new system for imparting constructive
notice of liens it would have said so, and also if the statutes were intended to provide
constructive notice to third persons, the legislature would have particularly defined
the rights of creditors, subsequent purchasers, and lienholders. Thus a pioneer
North Carolina decision 24 denied priority to a conditional seller whose lien was
duly perfected upon the certificate of title, but not upon the records. There the
court reasoned that since penal sanctions were imposed upon the purchaser who
failed to get the title, the legislature must have intended to work no change in the
civil rights of the parties. On the other hand, some authority will be found which
has given effect to the certificate of title as a means of constructive notice under
such laws. In Washington 25 and Indiana,' 28 decisions have protected purchasers
obtaining a clear certificate of title against the claims of prior lienholders whose
liens were preserved by filing or other principles of law. Usually these decisions are
grounded upon estoppel, where possession coupled with a certificate of ownership
in the lien-debtor create an appearance of ownership. It would seem that if estoppel
is to be applied in these cases, there is no reason why it should not also govern to de-
feat the rights of third persons who fail to examine the status of the instrument where
the lien is properly noted on the certificate' 27 This finds general support in the
practice of the public and the automobile industry in their reliance upon the cer-
tificate as a means for determining both ownership and lien interests. 28  Legal
L. B. Motors, Inc. v. Prichard, 303 Ill. App. 313, 25 N.E.ad 129 (1940) (buyer in regular course of
trade prevailed over lienholder who retained certificate); Community State Bank v. Crissinger, 89 N. E.ad
78 (Ind. App. 1949) (mortgage recorded, but not shown upon certificate); Owen v. Miller, 19o Okla.
205, 122 P.2d 140 (1942) (purchaser in regular course of trade who did not obtain certificate prevailed
over mortgagee who had recorded in local records and kept possession of certificate); see Meyer Herson
Auto Sales Co. v. Faunkhauser, 65 F.2d 655, 656 (D. C. App. 1933); In re Rosen, 23 F.2d 687 (D. Md.
X928) (". . . it is conceded by counsel for the petitioner and it is the opinion of this court that such
registration does not take the place of the recording of liens .. ").
... Carolina Discount Corp. v. Landis Motor Co., igo N. C. 157, 129 S. E. 414 (1925).
.
5 Merchants Rating & Adjusting Co. v. Skaug, 4 Wash.ad 46, 102 P.2d 227 (940) (purchaser who
obtained a clear title prevailed over mortgagee who had recorded locally).
"' Superior Finance Co. v. American Security Co., 107 Ind. App. 461, 25 N. E.2d 256 (1940); Cf.
Guaranty Discount Corp. v. Bowers, 94 Ind. App. 373, x58 N. E. 231 (932) (buyer in regular course
of trade who got clear certificate of title prevailed over conditional seller). In Nichols v. Bogda Motors,
Ix8 Ind. App. 156, 77 N. E.2d 905 (948), a subsequent Indiana purchaser prevailed over a Michigan
mortgagee who had filed in Michigan, but had not had his lien noted upon the title. The court refused to
give effect to the Michigan mortgage upon the ground that it was against the "established policy" of the
state of Indiana, although the mortgage would have been valid in Michigan. The same judge, however,
may have reversed the "policy" in the Community State Bank v. Crissinger, 89 N. E.2d 78 (Ind. App. 1949).
1-7 Cf. International Harvester Co. v. Holley, xo6 Ind. App. 329, i8 N. E.2d 484 (1939) (conditional
seller who retained title prevailed over creditors of buyer); Eline v. Commercial Credit Corp., 307 Ky.
77, 209 S. W.ad 846 (948) (Kentucky buyer charged with notice of Indiana conditional seller who had
noted lien upon certificate); Universal C. 1. T. Credit Corp. v. Walters, 230 N. C. 443, 53 S. E.2d 520
(1949) (Illinois conditional seller noted lien on certificate, and prevailed over North Carolina creditors);
Chandler v. Conabeer, 198 N. C. 757, 153 S. E. 313 (930) (mortgagee who did not file locally but
retained certificate of title prevailed over subsequent purchaser who was informed that mortgagor did not
have title); Schiefer v. Schnaufer, 71 Ohio App. 431, 5o N. E.2d 365 (I943) (Indiana mechanic's lien
not perfected on certificate defeated by Ohio purchaser under special Ohio statute); People's Finance &
Thrift Co. v. Shirk, 74 P.2d 379 (Okla. 1937).
.. See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Dassenko, 43 N. W.ad 299, 304 (N. D. 1950); Note, 25 INn.
L. J. 337, 338-339 (1950).
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recognition of this practice would eliminate the expense and time involved in the
search of local records, and give to purchasers and lenders a convenient source of
title information. While the general effect of these title certificate laws as imparting
constructive notice remains in doubt, the way is left clear in most of the states to
give the legislation sensible interpretation. The title certificate machinery is com-
plete enough to impart notice of liens, so that the courts would be justified in con-
struing the legislation as accomplishing an implied repeal of the general filing laws
with respect to the manner of imparting public notice. As to the rights of creditors,
purchasers, and other lienholders, no reason appears why the general recording laws
should not remain applicable.
The problem of whether local recording statutes have been superseded by the
title certificate legislation is further accentuated by the peculiar language found in
the "incomplete" title states and in New Jersey. There, the procedure for noting
liens upon the certificate apparently is confined to those liens incurred or in existence
at the time of transfers of "ownership," thus literally excluding the machinery for
registering the isolated mortgage or lien.129 As a result, several decisions will be
found where general filing provisions controlled the rights of third persons upon this
narrow ground. Such a decision is found in the case of Community State Banl( v.
Crissinger30 where the Indiana Appellate Court upheld a mortgage filed in the
county chattel mortgage records against a bona fide purchaser who had received an
unencumbered certificate of title. A similar interpretation has been consistently
followed in New Jersey,131 and in Pennsylvania13 under a similar statute since
amended to include all types of security transactions.133 It may be doubted whether
this, as one of several literal construction possibilities, conforms to the general pur-
pose of such legislation. It would appear that this constitutes judicial abortion of a
legislative effort to give birth to a new source of complete title information. Since
a method is outlined for noting liens upon a genuine transfer of "ownership," there
is no mechanical reason why an inferior kind of transfer of security interests should
be denied. Furthermore, there is ample authority in other fields of lawI' 4 to permit a
nominal re-transfer or re-issue by the parties to the lien transaction.
" States with such provisions: Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, North Carolina, North Dakota, South
Dakota, West Virginia, Wisconsin. See App. 2, col. i. New Jersey. See App. 3, col. 2.
10 89 N. E.2d 78 (Ind. App. i949); Note, 25 IND. L. J. 337 (1950).
'Security National Bank v. Bell, 125 N. J. L. 640, 17 A-ad 552 (Err. & App. 1941); cl. Butting.
hausen v. Rappeport, 131 N. J. Eq. 252, 24 A.2d 877 (Ch. 1942). Since these decisions, the New
Jersey statute has been amended, and now applies to any "contract," defined to mean a "conditional
sale agreement, bailment, lease, chattel mortgage, trust receipt or any other form of security or possession
agreement, wherein and whereby possession of a motor vehicle is delivered to the buyer .... (Italics
supplied.) N. J. STAT. ANN. §39:10-2 (Supp. 1949). Quaere: Whether statute applies to lien incurred
without a sale?
... Taplinger v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, ioi F.zd 274 (3d Cir. 1939).
.. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §33(b) (Supp. 1949); 4. In re Berlin, 147 F.2d 491 ( 3d Cir. 1945); First
National Bank v. Sheldon, 161 Pa. Super. 265, 54 A.2d 6i (1947) (statute validates chattel mortgages
previously not recognized by Pennsylvania law).
. Probably the best illustration is the use of the "straw-man" in real estate conveyance where
transfers, otherwise not permitted, may be accomplished. E.g., C. Holt v. Holt, 185 Tenn. 1, 202
S.W.2d 65o (1947); Boehringer v. Schmidt, 254 N. Y. 355, 173 N. E. 220 (1930).
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Under the Uniform Commercial Code. By stipulating that motor vehicle liens
shall be perfected through the title certificate where the statute provides for "regis-
tration of all liens on certificates of title,"' 35 the Code will leave a practical hazard
to lenders in many states. Of the doubtful title certificate jurisdictions, 36 it is
reasonably safe to conclude that this section of the Code will apply to Kansas, Michi-
gan, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wyoming, in so far as
their statutes generally provide for registration of all liens upon the certificate of
title' However, case law in many of these states has not yet settled whether the
statutes were intended to impart exclusive constructive notice of liens, and the Code
does not reckon with this situation. Because it does not, it may be assumed that the
omission was intentional.
As to the place for perfecting liens upon motor vehicles, confusion is clearly in-
vited in the states with "incomplete" certificate of title laws and New Jersey. The
language of such statutes apparently provides that only liens existing at the time
of transfer may be registered upon the certificate. Furthermore judicial construction
of such statutes is inconclusive, with the exception of Indiana where an intermediate
court has held that liens isolated from transfers cannot be entered upon the cer-
tificate' 38
It is suggested that the solution to this problem would be relatively simple. Since
adequate machinery for making the certificate the instrumentality for imparting
notice of liens has been provided in every title certificate state, elimination of the
word "all" would solve the problem. This, too, would extricate ambiguity from the
statute in a place where it should not exist, in as much as every motor vehicle lender
has a vital interest in knowing where the lien should be perfected.
Requirement that lien be registered with motor vehicle agency. As against third
parties, the effective date of the lien is variously fixed at the time of application or
filing or when the lien is noted upon the certificate of title by the central motor
vehicle department in 20 of the title certificate states. 3 Of these, Arizona, Arkansas,
and Utah provide a ten day period of grace from the time of execution, and in New
Mexico the lien becomes effective at the time the application is mailedY4 But since
all of the states contemplate that the application must channel through the proper
department, which in turn is required to note or show the lien upon the certificate,' 4 '
...U. C. C. §9-402 (Sept. 1950).
"'See notes x16, ix8 supra.
2" However, to the extent that these statutes do not provide for inventory liens, there remains the
possibility that the liens must be filed under the general filing provisions of the Code. Discussion upon
this subject will be found in the subsequent pages.
... See notes 130-133 supra.
... Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennesssee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia. See App. 3, col. 4.
... In California the lien of the conditional seller apparently attaches at the time of mailing. CAL
VEHICLE CODE ANN. §x86 (948).
"'tIn Nebraska and Ohio, liens upon inventory of new automobiles are perfected at the time
possession of the manufacturer's certificate is delivered to the lienholder. In Louisiana such liens are
perfected from the time the lien instrument is filed, without noting upon a certificate. See App. 3, col. 4.
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it may be fair to assume that the statutes fix the effective date of the lien at the time
of notation upon the certificate and entry in the records of the proper agency.
To the lienholder, and especially the professional lending agency, the requirement
that the lien clear through the central department charged with administration of the
certificate legislation constitutes somewhat of a nuisance for the reason that time and
expense are consumed by the menial task of mailing or otherwise presenting the
necessary papers for clearance and recordationY4 2  Consequently, a substantial num-
ber of cases will be found where the lienholder, instead of complying with the
formalities of the statute, has taken possession of the tide instrument in the con-
spicuous belief that lack of possession in the lien-debtor constitutes adequate con-
structive notice to the world that his ownership is not absolute. 143  With the excep-
tions of New Jersey and Wisconsin, where possession of the certificate or a duplicate
must be retained by the owner in possession, 44 legislation in none of the states makes
this procedure illegal.'45 On the other hand, the statutes do not purport to validate
this type of constructive notice, and as previously pointed out, many of the states
affirmatively require technical compliance as a condition precedent to constructive
notice against third persons.
It is not uncommon for a seller who retains a security interest in the vehicle to
keep title in his own name until the conditions of the lien have been performed
40
While this procedure is somewhat similar to the situation where the lienholder keeps
possession of the certificate, several characteristics of the transaction should be noted.
In the first place, the records of the motor vehicle department affirmatively show that
the lienholder has an interest in the motor vehicle, so that the public has a positive
means for determining who, and what his interest is. Secondly, statutes in practically
" "The present policy of some financing agencies is to file on only about 25 per cent of every xooo
transactions. The filing fees on the remaining 75 per cent are then put in reserve against filing loss
and subsequently result in a sizable source of income." AMERiCAN B NsKEs Ass'N BANK M4ANUAL ON AUTo-
as OBLE FINANCING 36 (941).
' E.g., In re Soss, 52 F. Supp. 123 (D. Del. 1943); Associates Inv. Co. v. National City Bank,
231 S.V.ad 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 195o); cf. Superior Finance Co. v. American Security Co., 1o7 Ind.
App. 461, 25 N. E.2d 256 (1940) (rider attached to certificate of tide showing liens, and delivered to
debtor).
"' N. J. STAT. ANN. §§39:io-6, 39:1o-1I (Supp. 1949) (duplicate copy issued to owner in possession
who must keep it with automobile); Wis. Acts x949, c. 1949, §85.os(3a) (certificate must be in possession
of owner). Where possession of the bill of sale was relinquished to a mortgagee, the New Jersey Court held
the lien invalid against a subsequent purchaser. Buttinghausen v. Rappeport, 131 N. J. Eq. 252, 24 A.2d
877 (Ch. 1942).
... Littel v. Brayton Motor & Accessory Co., 70 Colo. 286, 201 Pac. 34 (1921) (mortgage valid be-
tween parties, and against subsequent lienholder with notice); Chandler v. Conabeer, 198 N. C. 757, 153
S. E. 313 (1930); cf. In re Senetos, 29 F.2d 854 (D. C. Cal. 1928) (transfer of "tide or interest" did not
include mortgage).
"E.g., Coffey v. Williams, 69 Ariz. 126, 210 P.2d 959 (1949) (mortgagor endorsed certificate of
title to mortgagee who caused it to be transferred on the records-held parol evidence admissible to show
respective interests of parties); Washington Lumber & M. Co. v. McGuire, 213 Cal. 13, 1 P.2d 437
(1931) (where lienholder registered certificate in his own name-prevailed over prior lienholder who
allowed debtor to pass clear title); Anderson v. Commercial Credit Co., xo Mont. 333, ox P.2d 367
(1940) (conditional buyer did not receive certificate of title-held seller's assignee liable for penalty
on failure to deliver tide after payment); Yarwood v. DeLage, 91 N. E.2d 272 (Ohio App. 1949) (condi-
tional seller's rights sustained against bona fide purchaser who obtained duplicate certificate).
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all of the states prohibit this action either by penal sanction, or civil sanction
invalidating the sale.'47 This follows from the statutory provisions requiring assign-
ment of the certificate upon transfer of "ownership."
In these cases where the lienholder retains possession of the certificate, or tide in
his name, the failure to conform to the technical requirements of the statute must
further be weighed against the equities of third persons who transact business with
the lienholder. Subsequent lienholders are required to perfect their liens upon the
certificate of title for protection against third parties, and so good faith seemingly
would require them to get the certificate before making a loan.' 48  Subsequent pur-
chasers or transferees under the statutes legally are required to obtain an assign-
ment of the certificate, under the compulsion of either penal or civil sanctions. 49
Creditors, who normally rely upon the information shown by the lien records, would
be compelled to demand the title certificate, if the courts were to give effect to this
type of unperfected lien.15°
While the case law upon the subject is inconclusive, the tendency of the decisions
has been to protect the lienholder who acquires possession of the certificate or causes
it to be registered in his name.'j' This result can be justified upon the basis -that
", States making the transfer "void" or ineffective are: California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Kansas,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah. States which do not expressly impose
civil sanctions, but punish non-compliance by penal laws are: Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada,. New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wash-
ington, Wyoming. See App. 2, col. a; App. 3, col. 1.
1""Cf. Lux v. Lockridge, 65 Idaho 639, 150 P.2d 127 (1944) (one-who.failed to get certificate
not a bona fide purchaser). However, the statutes do not generally impose penal sanctions upon lien-
holders who fail to comply with the statute. See note 92, supra; cf. Metropolitan Securities Co. v. Warren
State Bank, 117 Ohio 69, 158 N. E. 81 (1927) (under former Ohio statute).
""°See App. 2, col. i; App. 3, col. '. In some states a contract for the price cannot be enforced
by a non-compliant seller. Sevier v. Roberts, 52 Cal. App.2d 403, 126 P.2d 380 (942); American
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Powers, 291 Mich. 3o6, 289 N. 'W. i7o (1939); Morgan v. Mulcahey, 298 S. W.
242 (Mo. App. 1927). But c. Wilson v. Mosko, iio Colo. 127, 130 P.2d 927 (1942). Likewise, the
purchaser has been denied relief. Vida v. Ruckle Bros. Inc., 53 A.2d 312 (N. J. 1947); i9 Miss. L. J. 241
(1948). But c. Willard H. George, Ltd. v. Barnett, 65 Cal. App.2d 828, i5o P.ad 591 (1944) (compliance
by purchaser of new car not required until operation upon highway). However, the courts may rceognize
equitable rights between the parties to a non-complaint sale. Ludwig v. Steger, 99 Cal. App. 234, 278
Pac. 494 (1929) (seller could replevin vehicle and recover for loss of use); Elder Chevrolet Co. v.
Bailey County Motor Co., 151 S. W.ad 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
"' Cf. Christian v. Boyd, 222 S. W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (lienholder retaining possession
of unregistered certificate defeated by subsequent mechanic's lienholder who extended credit).
... Colonial Finance Co. v. Hunt, 290 Ky. 299, i6o S. W.2d 591 (942) (finance company holding
possession of manufacturer's certificate prevailed over subsequent purchaser in course of trade); Com-
mercial Banking Corp. v. Active Loan Co., 135 Pa. Super. 124, 4 A.2d 616 (i939) (one retaining lien
under bailment lease with possession of certificate prevailed over subsequent lienholder); Associates Inv.
Co. v. National City Bank of Waco, 231 S. W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (chattel mortgagee who
retained possession of certificate of title given priority over subsequent purchaser in regular course of
trade); Clade v. National City Bank of Waco, 229 S. W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App. 195o); 4f. Nelson v.
Fisch, 39 N. W.2d 594 (Iowa 1949); Sims v. Sugg, x65 Kan. 489, 196 P.2d 19t (1948) (purchaser who
failed to get certificate of title did not prevail over owner who parted with possession on a bad check);
Maryland Credit Finance Corp. v. Franklin Credit Finance Corp., 164 Va. 579, 18o S. E. 4o8 (935)
(lien filed with motor vehicle agency but not noted on certificate--execution creditor preferred). In
Elder Chevrolet Co. v. Bailey County Motor Company, 151 S. W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), a sale
was made by a dealer who retained a chattel mortgage and the certificate of tide. The court strained to
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the certificate of title has become a type of commercial document of quasi-statutory
origin, possession of which is necessary to establish full rights of ownership. Conse-
quently, possession of the document is and should be sufficient to put buyers and
lienholders upon further inquiry if they are to satisfy the requirements necessary to
qualify as good faith purchasers.152 This view is recognized obliquely in Florida,
Idaho, Nebraska, and Ohio, where the statutes invalidate transfers and deny estoppel
against persons in possession of the certificate. 53
This result, however, may be subject to objection on the part of creditors, who
ordinarily rely upon the information to be found in the public records. Where
the lien does not clear through the proper motor vehicle agency, record of the lien
under the lien-debtor's name is lacking. Consequently, a substantial number of cases
have tended to protect creditors where the lien was not properly perfected. 5 4 A good
deal is to be said in support of the creditors, and the credit agencies, who take their
information from the public records. By compelling the creditor to determine the
debtor's ownership of a motor vehicle by asking for the certificate of title, an em-
barrassing and impractical method of credit information is substituted. But since
credit information normally comes from many other reliable sources the price might
not be too high to deny creditors this protection' 5 In the long run, the business
resolve the equities between the seller who had violated the statute, and a subsequent purchaser who was
equally as guilty. The court finally held that since the original sale was void, the seller could keep the
vehicle if the money paid by the purchaser was returned. The effect of this odd decision is considerably
nullified by the two Texas decisions cited above.
Failure of a seller to deliver the certificate of title constitutes a cloud upon the tide, and may give
grounds for equitable relief or rescission. Pacific Finance Corp. v. Gherna, 36 Ariz. 509, 287 Pac. 304
(1930) (conditional seller justified in refusing payment where certificate outstanding); Acquisto v. Bank
of America Nat. T. & Say. Ass'n, 213 P.2d 775 (Cal. 1950) (entruster forced to give up certificate of tide
when lien discharged); Buss v. McKee, 15 Colo. 159, 170 P.2d 268 (946) (assignor of mortgage who
failed to perfect lien upon certificate forced to pay damages to assignee); Larison-Frees Chevrolet Co. v.
Payne, 163 Ore. 276, 96 P.2d io67 (939) (conditional purchaser permitted to rescind where certificate
of title not delivered within 21 days after sale); Automobile Banking Corp. v. Weicht, x6o Pa. Super.
422, 51 A.2d 409 (1947) (entruster could compel trustee to give certificate of tide showing entruster's
limited interest only).
Many cases will be found where the lienholder has been defeated, but most of the cases concern
the rights of buyers in the course of trade. E.g., Associates Discount Corp. v. Hardesty, X22 F.2d x8
(D. C. Cir. 1941); Bank of America Nat. T. & Say. Ass'n v. National Funding Corp., 45 Cal.
App.2d 320, 114 P.2d 49 (i94i); L. B. Motors, Inc. v. Prichard, 303 Ill. App. 313, 25 N. E.2d 129
(940); Owven v. Miller, 19o Okla. 205, 122 P.2d 140 (942).
5 Cf. Jones v. Levis, 36 N. W.2d 757 (Iowa 1949) (where purchaser upon investigation could
have determined rights of one who sold on a bad check).
... See A~p. 3, col. I.
"' Wargin v. Wargin, 29 Cal.2d 843, x8o P.2d 349 (1947) (transfer of title to mortgagee treated
as a fraud on creditors since mortgagor remained in possession); In re Soss, 52 F. Supp. 123 (D. Del.
1943) (trustee in bankruptcy preferred to mortgagee in possession of certificate and power of attorney);
Security National Bank v. Bell, 125 N. J. L. 640, 17 A.2d 552 (Err. & App. 1941) (lien creditor defeated
prior mortgagee holding title in its name); In re McDonald Sales, Inc., 5x F. Supp. 73 (W. D. Pa.
1943) (trustee in bankruptcy prevailed over finance company to whom titles assigned in blank); Christian
v. Boyd, 222 S. W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); cf. Meskiman v. Adams, 83 Ind. App. 447, x49 N. E.
93 (1925) (fraudulent conveyance).
"' Cf. Willard H. George, Ltd. v. Barnett, 65 Cal. App.2d 828, 150 P.2d 591 (1944) (daughter's
automobile tided in mother's name--hld: creditors of mother could not reach property unless actual
reliance upon apparent ownership); Universal Credit Co. v. Botetourt Motor Co., x8o Va. X59, 21 S.
E.2d 8oo (1942) (delay in perfecting security interest on title did not defeat rights of lienholder who
perfected before creditors obtained lien); In re Lowry, 40 F.2d 32r (4th Cir. 1930) (certificate of tide
gave wrong motor.number, but valid against trustee in bankruptcy).
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of financing automobiles would gain in so far as a cheap but reliable method of im-
parting constructive notice would be available to the public and the lending industry.
One obstacle to the use of the tide certificate without proper registration arises
from the fact that the legal machinery in all the states permits an owner to replace a
certificate of tide by applying for a duplicate. If the lienholder's interest does not
appear upon the records of the issuing motor vehicle department, it is relatively easy
for the lien-debtor to obtain a duplicate, and pass the substitute instrument on to a
third party.'5 6 Here the provisions of the statutes are quite inadequate. Some of
the statutes provide that the duplicate must be so marked.'5 ' Others provide in no
uncertain terms that the old certificate is "void."' 58 Under the former, purchasers
may be put on notice that the tide of one passing such a certificate is doubtful.'59
Under the latter type of statute, purchasers may be justified in accepting the cer-
tificate at face value. Statutes without either provision leave much to be desired. But
as a general rule, the case law has tended to protect third persons who rely upon the
status of a duplicate certificate, as against the claims of prior lienholders who fail to
have their interest noted upon the certificate of tide and upon the records.' 60 The
soundness of this position is evidenced by the statutes which place this risk upon
the lienholder who does not properly perfect his security interest.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code. The Uniform Commercial Code in gen-
eral language provides that a security interest is perfected "when registered" on the
certificate of tide in those states with qualifying legislation.' 6' This adds neither
See App. 2, col. 8; App. 3, col. 13.
... These states are Florida, Idaho, New Mexico, Ohio, Texas, Utah, and Washington.
... These states are Arkansas, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, and Tennessee.
"" Some states either require the vendor to put up indemnity, or permit purchasers to require such
indemnity. These states are California, Colorado, Florida, Nebraska, and Texas.
.. Motor Investment Co. v. Knox City, r41 Tex. 530, 174 S. W.2d 482 (1943); General Credit
Corp. v. Lee James, Inc., 8 'Wash.2d x85, III P.2d 762 (1941); cf. Shockley v. Hill, g9 Colo. 45r, 15
P.2d 623 (1932) (title papers obtained by purchaser on bad check); Sax Motor Co. v. Mann, 7 N. D.
22r, 299 N. W. 691 (941) (purchaser from seller in possession who obtained duplicate title defeated
because of actual knowledge of buyer's interest). Where the records of the motor vehicle agency fail
to show an outstanding interest a duplicate certificate will, and should, be issued. Cf. Rigney v. Swingley,
112 Mont. 104, 113 P.2d 344 (1941). Where, however, a new certificate is obtained by forgery under
circumstances negating apparent authority to deal with the certificate, the instrument is usually held
invalid as an indicia of ownership. Pagner v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 66 Ariz. 157, 185 P.2d
525 (1947) (foreign mortgagor obtaining clear certificate of title could not pass good title to Arizona pur-
chaser); Winship v. Standard Finance Co., 40 Ariz. 382, 12 P.2d 282 (1932) (automobile left for
repairs with dealer who forged assignment of certificate upon which a loan advanced by bank-held:
for owner); Yarwood v. DeLage, gi N. E.2d 272 (Ohio App. 1949) (duplicate obtained by conditional
buyer ineffective to pass title to innocent party); Adkisson v. Waitman, 213 P.sd 465 (Okla. 1949) (wife
forged name on blank certificate left by husband in dresser drawer-husband recovered automobile from
purchaser). In Erie County United Bank v. Bogart, 75 Ohio App. 250, 61 N. E.2d 811 (1944), the
court invalidated a mortgage in the hands of an assignee bank where the mortgage was given under a
power of attorney executed by a fictitious purchaser. The assignor-dealer at the time of the sale was the
owner of the vehicle, but the mortgage was voided upon the ground of forgery. Cf. W. P. Herbert Co.
v. Powell, 90 Cal. App. 782, 266 Pac. 62o (1928) (transferor entrusted with possession of both vehicle
and certificate assigned in blank-held: purchaser charged with notice of lack of authority to pass title
because name inserted included initial which did not appear in owner's signature on blank assignment);
Swartz v. White, 8o Utah 150, 13 P.2d 643 (932) (no power to transfer certificate assigned to possessor in
blank).
1"1 U. C. C. §9-402 (Sept. 1950).
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certainty nor uniformity to the various state provisions upon the subject. Presumably
the intent was to leave the matter of time and manner for perfecting vehicle liens
to the separate states without introducing changes to local procedures, the effect of
which could not clearly be foreseen. Such an approach might also be defended upon
the ground that by doing so the Code would have been forced to invade regulatory
fields outside its general purpose. This, however, overlooks the uniform pattern of
the legislation in all of the states, a pattern which lends itself to a suggested possi-
bility of uniform legislation fixing the time and manner for perfecting liens upon
the certificate of title. Rhetorically, the possibility is this: Should the Code give to
the certificate of title the commercial recognition it has partially received by the
courts, bankers, dealers, and the public, to the extent that presence or lack of posses-
sion of the instrument itself constitutes constructive notice of the lien? The indica-
tions are that it should.
First, the title certificate laws were established chiefly for the purpose of pre-
venting theft. 12 The public records, therefore, are sufficient for this purpose if they
require transfers of "ownership" interests to clear through the policing agency. Re-
cordation of lien interests, on the other hand, principally serves the purpose of
public notice, a purpose for which the records were not designed, and which has been
accomplished through the title instrument. In fact, the statutes do not impose penal
sanctions for failure to have liens noted upon the title certificate, a legislative recog-
nition that the title certificate laws serve a dual function. With the further risk that
outstanding title interests appear upon the records, penal sanctions seem sufficient to
insure compliance in the lien-retention sale. 63 Second, possession of the instrument
carries with it a recognized source of title information. The public has become
accustomed to regard the instrument with commercial respect because it has an
official, statutory background, and because it avoids the otherwise necessary trek to
the public records' 64 Third, this effect has been partially accomplished through the
"good faith" provisions of the Commercial Code which by editorial comment "
impose upon dealers and possibly bankers an affirmative duty to acquire a certificate
of tide in so far as third persons are concerned. 6 ' Fourth, the state legislatures have
been forced, either by the dealer lobby or sound reasons to abandon the requirement
that the title certificate be registered with the proper department where the instru-
ment is acquired by dealers. As a consequence practically all of the statutes permit
the dealer to re-assign the title certificate without acquiring a new one10 This
"2In general see Lusk, Effect of Registration and Certificate of Title Acts on the Ownership of Motor
Vehicles, 21 IN. Bus. SrtmEs x (1941).
... Lien-sellers must comply with the transfer provisions under most statutes. E.g., Sevier v. Roberts,
52 Cal. App.2d 403, 126 P.2d 380 (1942).
... Cf. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Dassenko, 43 N. ,V.2d 299 (N. D. 595o).
... U. C. C. §1-203, comment 2 (Spring 195o). In general see discussion at notes 103-108 supra.
... The Secured Transactions part of the Code also provides that subsequent lienholders will prevail
over prior security interests only when the second lien is perfected. U. C. C. §9-3ox(s)(b) (Sept.
195o). Consequently a subsequent lienholder will defeat a prior secured lender in possession of the
certificate, only when his lien is noted upon a duplicate certificate.
"67 See App. 2, col. 5; App. 3, col. 9. In the states providing for manufacturer's certificates, transfers
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legislative policy no doubt is directed by the demands of the trade, and for the same
reason the policy should be extended to retail security transactions which are a
necessary adjunct to the business. Fifth, while creditors may have cause to com-
plain on the ground that this would deny to them a public source of credit knowl-
edge,'08 their inconvenience may not be a serious one in view of the overall con-
venience provided to the credit industry. And finally, the danger of fraud on the
part of lien-debtors who retain, under the statutes, power to apply for and receive
a duplicate tide certificate could be eliminated by recognizing this as one of the
risks that the lienholder undertakes when the lien is not properly cleared through
official channels?" A practical solution would be to protect the lienholder so long
as a duplicate certificate is not acquired by the lien-debtor or one claiming under him.
Rights of third parties. The total lack of care with which the rights of third
parties have been defined by lien provisions of the various tide certificate statutes has
been mentioned, 70 and the scant case authority upon the subject has done little to
clarify the overall picture. 71 It is sufficient to demonstrate the need for uniformity by
two contrasting decisions from each side of the continent dealing with the rights of
creditors. In Chelhar v. Acme Garage,-72 a California decision preferred an execution
creditor over a mortgagee who had failed to disclose his lien upon the certificate of
tide but had repossessed the property before execution. The Virginia court in
Universal Credit Co. v. Botetourt Motor Company'73 reached a conclusion directly
to the contrary upon the basis that delay in perfecting a lien under the Virginia
statute affected only the rights of lien creditors.
While the problem of defining the rights of third parties is, perhaps, a technical
one, and a matter which for policy reasons might well vary from state to state, the
lack and diversity of judicial interpretation in this field of law makes it one ripe for
uniform legislation. Here the Code will serve a useful purpose in settling the rights
of third parties without litigation, and this the Code does with care, and with certain-
ty. 74 Failure to file or perfect the lien is fatal only against creditors who become lien
creditors without notice, but a purchase money security interest is valid against lien
from manufacturers to dealers are not generally required to clear through the central agency. E.g., Craw-
ford Finance Co. v. Derby, 63 Ohio App. 50, 25 N. E.2d 306, 308 (1939): "The manufacturer's certificate
was the key to the whole situation. As long as plaintiff held it, it knew no one could acquire a title
or lien ahead of its lien .. "
1.. See cases cited notes 154, 155 supra. ... See note I6o supra.
170 The statutory provisions are set out at note 55 supra.
' E.g., Consumers Credit Co. v. Manifold, 65 Idaho 238, 142 P.2d i5o (1943) (sheriff privileged to
levy upon vehicle where unacknowledged lien filed with motor vehicle department); In re Soss, 52
F. Supp. 123 (D. Del. 1943) (trustee in bankruptcy prevailed over lienholder in possession of title
certificate with power of attorney where not perfected through central agency); In re Berlin, 147 F.ad
491 (3d Cir. 1945) (perfected lien valid against creditors); In re McDonald Sales, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 73 (W.
D. Pa. 1943) (trustee in bankruptcy recovered vehicles from financer who held titles but had not per-
fected with department).
1 2 18 Cal. App.2d 775, 61 P.2d 1232 (1936). But cf. In re Wiegand, 27 F. Supp. 725 (S. D.
Cal. X939).
173 x8o Va. 159, 21 S. E.2d 8oo (1942); 29 VA. L. REV. 505 (1943); Janney v. Bell, xii F.2d 03
(4th Cir. X940).
"'U. C. C. §9-301 (Sept. 1950).
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creditors for ten days without perfecting. Subsequent secured lenders who become
such without knowledge and perfect their liens first, prevail over the unfiled lien.
Buyers obtaining possession before notice cut off the rights of non-filing secured
lenders, but the purchase money lienholder has ten days to file his lien against a
buyer in bulk.
As applied to the motor vehicle problem under the title certificate laws, the Code
presents one minor problem of policy. It normally takes a period of time between
the consummation of the loan and the clearing of the lien through the central motor
vehicle agency.175 The agency is often geographically located to account for the
delay. While the ten day period of grace given by the Code is sufficient against
creditors and bulk purchasers, there may be need to protect the secured lender in this
case against subsequent buyers for a like period of time.170 Since the lienholder
can acquire possession of the certificate of title at the time of the loan, there is no
reason why protection should not be extended against these parties, at least for the
period of grace. This, of course, could be accomplished through the simple expedi-
ent of recognizing possession of the title instrument as a form of notice, as previously
suggested 77
Inventory financing. The use of the title certificate in dealer financing has led to
a considerable amount of litigation, and a mass of judicial dogma which neither
simplifies nor provides enlightenment of the problem. The difficulty appears to
stem from several sources. Of these, probably the most important has been the gen-
eral policy of the law to protect purchasers in the regular course of trade.1 78 This pol-
icy is at odds with a system which permits a financer to perfect his lien upon an in-
strument which buyers under the tide laws are required to get. As a consequence,
finance companies who find that a dealer has sold inventory and appropriated the
proceeds are inclined to proceed against the buyer in the regular course of trade upon
the theory that the lien (if it prohibited sale) is good against such purchasers if
perfected upon the tide certificate. The reasoning for this proceeds upon the theory
that all purchasers are required to comply with the tide certificate laws and therefore
this includes buyers in the regular course of trade. Here the courts have strained on
the one side to protect the buyer, and upon the other to rationalize the literal effect
of the statutes which either impose civil sanctions or invalidate transfers contrary to
the tide certificate laws.' 79 In the great bulk of cases the buyer in the regular course
115 See, e.g., Colorado State Bank v. Riede, 92 Colo. 361, 20 P.2d xolo (5933).
1.' Where the first lienholder acquires possession of the certificate, limited protection is given against
subsequent lienholders by the Code, since subsequent lienholders must perfect their security interest first.
This protection is restricted by the possibility that a subsequent lienholder could take the vehicle by way
of pledge, or the remote possibility that the subsequent lienholder could acquire a duplicate certificate.
.. See discussion at notes 162-i69 supra.
'...E.g., Fogle v. General Credit, Inc., 1:22 F.2d 45 (D. C. Cir. 1941).
'"E.g., California Standard Finance Corp. v. Riverside Finance Co., xii Cal. App. sx, 295 Pac.
555 (1931) (where lienholder retained certificate of tide and dealer sold to buyers on conditional sale,
held assignee of purchaser in course of trade prevailed--assignee of purchaser on "fake sale" did not);
Peper v. American Exchange National Bank, 357 Mo. 652, 210 S. W.2d 41 (948) (prior purchaser in
regular course preferred over subsequent lienholder who got certificate of title).
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of trade has won out, though often on a rather weak rationale s° In states where
the courts are disinclined to impose civil sanctions for non-compliance with the title
laws imposing penal sanctions, the purchaser in regular course of trade is usually
protected. This position is illustrated by Associates Discount Corporation v. Hard-
esty,'"" where the court protected the buyer against a finance company which had
retained the certificate of origin upon a new vehicle in the possession of a dealer.
The argument that the buyer could not be a good faith purchaser, since he did not
obtain the necessary transfer papers, was discarded on the simple ground that the
law imposed other sanctions only, and therefore the prior law extending protection to
purchasers in regular course of trade remained unaltered.
Serious interpretive difficulty is created by the statutes which purport to make all
sales contrary to their provisions "void" or otherwise invalid' 8 Literally, most of
the statutes make no exemption in favor of purchasers in the regular course of
trade.'83  As a consequence the courts in these states have been inclined to uphold
the inventory lienholder against all third parties.' 4 There is, however, a definite
tendency to protect the buyer in regular course of trade where the lienholder is
guilty of technical omissions in perfecting the lien upon the certificate and through
the proper agency.'
8 5
"'
8 Fogle v. General Credit Inc., 122 F.2d 45 (D. C. Cir. 1941); Bank of America Nat. T. &
Sav. Ass'n v. National Funding Corp., 45 Cal. App.2d 320, 114 P.2d 49 (94z); California Standard
Finance Corp. v. Riverside Finance Co., III Cal. App. 151, 295 Pac. 555 (931) (decided before
present California statute excluding trust receipts); Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Bandel, z6o Fla. 925, 37
So.ad 366 (1948); L. B. Motors, Inc. v. Prichard, 303 Ill. App. 313, 25 N.E.2d 129 (1940); Rasmussen
v. 0. E. Lee & Co., 104 Mont. 278, 66 P.2d i19 (1937); Buttinghausen v. Rappeport, 131 N. J. Eq.
252, 24 A.2d 877 (Ch. 1942); Finance Corp. of N. J. v. Jones, 97 N. J. L. io6, I16 Ad. 277 (Sup. Ct.
1922), a0'd, 98 N. J. L. 165, 119 Ad. 171 (Err. & App. 1922); Automobile Finance Co. v. Munday, 137
Ohio St. 504, 30 N. E.2d oo2 (1940); Erie County United Bank v. Bogart, 75 Ohio App. 250, 6x
N. E.2d 811 (1944); Owen v. Miller, 190 Okla. 205, 122 P.2d 140 (942); Motor Investment Co. v.
Knox City, 141 Tex. 530, 174 S. W.2d 482 (1943). The buyer in regular course of trade who receives a
clear certificate of tide is always protected against inventory lienholders where the lien is not perfected
through the tide certificate. La Porte Discount Corp. v. Bessinger, 91 Ind. App. 635, 171 N. E. 323
(1930); Sorensen v. Pagenkopf, 151 Kan. 913, 101 P.2d 928 (1940); Daas v. Contract Purchase Corp.,
318 Mich. 348, 28 N. W.2d 226 (1947); Rasmussen v. 0. E. Lee & Co., 104 Mont. 278, 66 P.2d
119 (1937).
181122 F.2d 18 (D. C. Cir. 1941). ... See APP. 3, col. I.
"' However, the statutes in Florida, Idaho, Nebraska, Ohio, and Texas literally protect lienholders
in possession of the certificate against purchasers in the course of trade although a power of sale is
given. FLORIDA STAT. ANN. §319.22(1) (1949); IDAHO CODE ANN. §49-415 (1949); NEB. REV. STAT.
§6o-iio (943); Oseo CODE ANN. §6290-4 (1945); TEx. STAT., PENAL CODE art. 1436-1, §45 (1948).
.. Colonial Finance Co. v. Hunt, 290 Ky. 299, i6o S. W.2d 591 (942) (applying Ohio law);
Crawford Finance Co. v. Derby, 63 Ohio App. 50, 25 N. E.2d 3o6 (939); Associates Inv.. Co. v.
National City Bank of Waco, 231 S. W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Clade v. National City Bank of
Waco, 229 S. W.2d 8i 5 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); cf. Lux v. Lockridge, 65 Idaho 639, 150 P.2d 127 (1944)
(customer left vehicle with dealer to be subsequently traded in).
.. E.g., San Joaquin Valley Securities Co. v. Prather, 123 Cal. App. 378, nI P.2d 45 (1932);
Buttinghausen v. Rappeport, 131 N. J. Eq. 252, 24 A.2d 877 (Ch. X942) (financer kept possession of
certificate contrary to statute); Automobile Finance Co. v. Munday, X37 Ohio St. 504, 30 N.E.2d 1oo2
(940) (finance company obtained certificate showing lien in transferee who had never obtained proper
assignment of certificate); Motor Investment Co. v. Knox City, 141 Tex. 530, 174 S. W.2d 482 (1943)
(buyer in regular course protected without receiving proper certificate on ground that statute did not*
apply until automobile used on highway); Nicewarner v. Alston, 228 S. W.2d 872 (Tex. Civ. App. 195o)
(bank loaned upon possession of manufacturer's title without having lien noted thereon held for pur-
chaser in regular course of trade).
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Judicial inclination to protect the purchaser in regular course of trade and to
discourage dealer financing through the title certificate machinery often results from
statutory provisions which grant special rights to dealers, and in some cases expressly
negate floor plan liens. As a consequence, the certificate of title serves no useful
purpose in expressing notice of liens upon inventory in California and Missouri,
where legislation verbally excludes such types of liens.18 6 The bulk of the states 8 7
have no provisions requiring dealers to obtain either a certificate of origin or an
original title for new vehicles. This, of course, makes the title machinery inadequate
for handling inventory liens upon new vehicles.' At least, it makes for uncer-
tainty because third persons have no practical way of knowing whether a dealer has
acquired the certificate or not. Furthermore, transferees from dealers are not
required by the sanction provisiong of the laws to get a certificate from the dealer,
but at most are required to obtain a bill of sale or other assignment which can simply
be duplicated. With respect to used automobiles, dealers are generally required to
obtain an assignment of the certificate from their immediate transferors, and while
the certificate may be re-assigned without clearing through the motor vehicle de-
partment, purchasers from them are compelled to get the re-assigned certificate.
Therefore there may be some cause for permitting inventory liens upon such
property to be shown through the title certificate.' s However, some of the statutes
anticipate that the dealer may make the necessary application for the certificate of
... See App. 3, col. 7. E.g., Universal Credit Co. v. M. C. Gale, Inc., 40 Cal. App.2d 796, Xo5 P.2d
1003 (1940); Bank of America Nat. T. & Say. Ass'n v. National Funding Corp., 45 Cal. App.2d 320,
114 P.2d 49 (1941). However, it has been held that failure on the part of a financcr to get the tide
certificate may create an estoppel in favor of a subsequent trust receipt holder who takes a certificate of
tide from the dealer. People's Finance & Thrift Co. v. Bowman, 58 Cal. App.2d 729, 137 P.2d 729
(1943). Since the California act excludes only trust receipts, it is technically possible that other
security transactions involving, motor vehicle inventory may fall within the statute. Metropolitan Fin.
Corp. v. Morf, 42 Cal. App.2d 756, 109 P.2d 969 (194). In Missouri, chattel mortgages by dealers,
and liens incurred upon sales by distributors are not required to be noted upon the certificate of title.
Butler County Finance Co. v. Miller, 225 S. WV.2d 135 (Mo. App. 1949) (mortgage retained by dealer
valid against subsequent purchaser from buyer in regular course of trade who obtained a clear certificate);
Interstate Securities Co. v. Barton, 236 Mo. App. 325, 153 S. W.2d 393 (194).
... See App. 3, col. 9; App. 2, col. 5.
"' First National Bank v. Emlenton Motor Co., x53 Pa. Super. 404, 34 A.2d 43 (1943) (under prior
Pennsylvania statute). In most of these states the dealer is required to give his own bill of sale, with
the consequent result that third persons are unable to know whether there is an outstanding bill of sale
without consulting the lien records. The problem is well illustrated by Finance Corp. of N. J. v. Jones, 97
N. J. L. io6, 1i6 Ad. 277 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 98 N. J. L. 165, ii9 At. I (Err. & App. 1922). In this case
the New Jersey statute required a dealer to 'give a bill of sale upon transfer. The dealer involved gave two
bills of sale, one to a finance company, the other to a buyer in regular course. The buyer prevailed. Cl.
Colorado State Bank v. Riede, 92 Colo. 361, 20 P.2d 1o1 (1933) (title passed when dealer gave bill
of sale, and subsequent lienholder defeated).
188E.g., Metropolitan Fin. Corp. v. Morf, 42 Cal. App.2d 756, 109 P.2d 969 (1941) (wholesaler in
used automobiles who sold to dealer but perfected lien upon title prevailed over subsequent lienholder);
Buss v. McKee, 115 Colo. 159, 170 P.2d 268 (1946) (mortgagee who filed in county records suffered loss
when dealer transferred good tide to good faith buyer); Sorensen v. Pagenkopf, 151 Kan. 913, 101 P.2d
928 (1940) (assignee of "fake" mortgage given by salesman to dealer defeated by subsequent purchaser
who obtained clear title); Rasmussen v. 0. E. Lee & Co., 104 Mont. 278, 66 P.2d 19 (1937)
(assignee of "fake" conditional sale between dealer and salesman held inferior to purchaser in regular
course who received unencumbered tide); Commercial Banking Corp. v. Active Loan Co. of Phila.
delphia, 135 Pa. Super. 124, 4 A.2d 616 (1939) (inventory lienholder in possession of titles to used auto-
mobiles prevailed over subsequent lienholder).
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title on transfers by him, thus indicating a legislative intent to protect purchasers in
the course of trade whether a certificate of title was in fact acquired or not. 9° In
any event the general reliance of the buying public upon the word of the dealer
regarding the technical matters of registration and tiding is sufficient cause for
extending protection to this class of persons?-
Lenders will find that loans upon inventory must be perfected through the
certificate of title in those states-Florida, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Tennessee,
Texas, and Virginiai'9 -where statutes affirmatively require compliance with the
title certificate laws. As pointed out above, legislation in California and Missouri" 3
quite clearly requires such liens to be perfected upon other records. This leaves the
effect of the statutes of the other states in serious doubt, especially as to the inventory
financing of new vehicles with respect to both the place of filing and the rights of
purchasers in regular course of trade.' 94  Thus cautious lenders in states which do
not require titling of new vehicles by dealers would be wise to comply with the
general filing statutes and to demand from thedealer a certificate of tide upon which
the lien may be perfected. Policy' considerations lead one to believe that the tide
certificate is useless in inventory financing. The great cost of handling each tide
certificate adds expense to an already costly financing business, and because dealers
must have the title certificate to carry on their business, surrender of the instrument
by the dealer to the lienholder inevitably will slow up sales.'9" The present machin-
ery provided by the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, and that offered by the Com-
mercial Code, furnish better and more equitable protection.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code. Any doubt in the title certificate states
as to the rights of the buyer in ordinary course of business is resolved by the Code
which provides that such purchaser takes "free of a security interest even though
perfected and even though the buyer knows of the terms of the security agree-
ment."'0 6 This will do much to create uniformity, and add certainty with regard to
inventory liens perfected upon the tide certificate.
... In Florida, Michigan, Nebraska, and Ohio the dealer is permitted to handle the paper routine in
obtaining the certificate of title for purchasers. FLA. StAT. ANN. §319.23(5) (1949); Mich. Acts 195o, c.
300, §257.217(b); NEB. REv. STAT. §6o-io6 (x943); Omo Con ANN. §6290-5 (945).
20" "It is common knowledge that dealers frequently, if not always, take care of title transfers and
registration, as well as licensing, as part of the transaction of sale, often completing these matters after
receiving payment and making delivery." Rutledge, J., in Fogle v. General Credit, Inc., 122 F.2d 45
(D. C. App. 1941), 136 A. L. R. 814, 821 (1941); Dennis v. Bank of America Nat. T. & Sav. Ass'n, 34
Cal. App.2d 618, 94 P.2d 51, 55 (939) (custom on part of dealers to handle paper work and application
for certificate of title established by employee of motor vehicle department).
...See App. 3, col. 7; Universal Credit Co. v. Botetourt Motor Co., i8o Va. 159, 21 S. E.2d 8oo
(1942). See cases cited note 184 supra.
"" See note 186 supra.
... Cf. Colorado State Bank v. Riede, 92 Colo. 361, 20 P.2d ioio, ioHi (1933) ("The act does not
require the purchaser of a new automobile from a dealer to record his dealer's bill of sale as a condition
precedent to the passing of title to him."); Finance Corp. of N. J. v. Jones, 97 N. J. L. io6, i16 At. 277
(Sup. Ct.), aft'd, 98 N. J. L. x65, 119 Ad. 171 (Err. & App. 1922) (dealer gave two bills of sale);
Owen v. Miller, x9o Okla. 205, 122 P.2d 140 (1942).
t05 Cf. SMITH, MARKETING OF UsED AuToMoBLEs 192 (1941); Hanna, The Extension of Public
Recordation, 31 COL. L. Rav. 617, 632-633 (i931).
"
0 U. C. C. §9"307 (Sept. 1950).
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However, the Code provision requiring liens to be perfected by registation upon
the title certificate in states providing for registration of "all liens" on the certificate
of tide will add still further confusion, and probably make for non-intended results.
This arises from the doubt existing in many states as to whether "all" types of in-
ventory liens may be shown upon the certificate of title. 1 T The California and
Missouri statutes are clearly excluded from this section, since the laws of those states
do not provide for the registration of inventory liens in this manner 8  It seems
unsound to exclude states from the operation of this section of the Code merely
because inadequate provision has been made by their laws for notation of liens upon
the certificate of title for another, and, probably, more important reason. The title
certificate upon which liens are noted does not provide a satisfactory method for im-
parting notice of inventory security interests because the instrument is needed by
the dealer for carrying on his business. Retention of the certificate by financers will
constitute a nuisance because of the delay involved in handling each title trans-
action.P' Therefore it would satisfy the needs of the dealer, the financer, and third
parties to permit public filing, separate and apart from the title records. Speaking
generally, four classes of persons have an interest in knowing of automobile inventory
liens. They are purchasers in the regular course of trade; bulk purchasers; other
lienholders; and creditors. Purchasers in the regular course of trade are adequately
provided for by the Code. The others, bulk purchasers, lienholders, and creditors,
would find substantial protection in the public records without lien interests being
shown upon the certificate of tide.20  This difficulty could be eliminated simply by
excluding inventory liens from the Code section requiring liens to be perfected by
registration on the tide. This would mean that inventory liens would be filed in
the central or local records provided for in the case of other inventory liens.20' Such
an arrangement would add symmetry to the Code plan of filing, so that liens cover-
ing inventory, equipment, and accounts would be perfected upon the same records.
Title certificate as a document of commerce--assignment of chattel paper. In
the purchase of automobiles much of the consumer credit is handled through
the process of discounting or assigning chattel paper taken by dealers in the course
of retail sales.202 In this way the burden of financing retail purchasers is cast upon
banks and finance companies, the dealer in this indirect fashion being relieved of
the burden. Thus a dealer who, for example, sells an automobile on a conditional
sale can take the papers signed by the buyer to his bank or finance company, which
will in turn either purchase the paper or make a loan on its security. Consequently,
the dealer not only is able to purchase more inventory, but is also able to devote a
larger share of his time and capital to the buying and selling of the commodity.
1? Cf. Nicewarner v. Alston, 228 S. W.2d 872 (Tex. Civ. App. 195o).
... See note 186 supra. 199 See note 195 supra.
-oThe assumption is made upon the ground that this group is made up of professional business
men who normally have at their disposal information from the records furnished by credit investigation
agencies.
2
.U. C. C. §9-401 (Sept. 1950).
202 SMITH, MARKETING UsED AUTO.MOBILES 193 (1941).
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Such a type of wholesale financing has the additional advantage of including in one
package both the sale of the automobile and the retail credit.
With the dealer occupying a position of quasi-trust, however, several serious prob-
lems may confront the assignee financing agent. The assignee must gamble on the
lien's having been properly filed or recorded as well as the assignment debtor's owner-
ship of the vehicle. Steps must be taken by the assignee to determine whether the
dealer is covered by an inventory lien which includes after-acquired property. In
such a transaction there is the risk of a double assignment. Also, unless the dealer is
empowered to make collections, the prudent assignee will notify the account debtor
in order to avoid the trouble which payments made to the dealer may cause. Finally,
the assignee takes some chance that the sale is not made to a genuine retail purchaser,
since the dealer can, by a "fake" sale to a fictitious person or an employee, finance his
inventory at the expense of an unsuspecting bank which believes that it is receiving
good retail paper. While the above risks are no doubt to be expected in such a type
of financing business, they are nevertheless risks which add to the cost of the loan
and must ultimately be paid by the consumer. Banks and lending institutions who
normally buy or loan upon this type of paper have found that the presence of the
title certificate among the other instruments or papers adds an appearance of genuine-
ness to the transaction as well as a sense of security. It is, however, a sense which
may be misleading. The chief utility of the title certificate stems from its use as a
substitute form of recording or filing. In other words, the discounting bank can
eliminate filing and the time-consuming search of the local records, at least in the
states where liens must be shown upon the certificate of title.,03
Some serious difficulty arises in cases involving double assignments. Ordinarily,
this occurs where the dealer has given a prior inventory lien covering after-acquired
accounts or chattel paper. Instead of accounting for the chattel paper the dealer
assigns it to a second financer. In cases where the assigned obligation is not negoti-
able,204 a dispute may arise between the inventory lienholder and the assignee of the
retail paper. Substantial case law dealing with the effect of the presence or absence
of the certificate of title in this situation is not to be found, but there is some indi-
cation that the assignee bank receiving a duly perfected certificate of title with an
assignment of the chattel paper will be protected.20 5 This conclusion is logical in
2" Consequently, where the assignee does not get the title certificate, the rights of the assignee may
be defeated by third parties. E.g., Superior Finance Co. v. American Security Co., 1o7 Ind. App. 461,
25 N. E.2d 256 (940) (assignee entrusted conditional buyer with clear certificate of tide); General
Acceptance Corp. v. Davis, 169 Kan. 22o, 218 P.2d 181 (1950) (assignee failed to get certificate of
tide); Commercial Banking Corp. v. Active Loan Co., 135 Pa. Super. 124, 4 A.2d 616 (1939) (assignee
failed to get title papers-prior lienholder prevailed). In Missouri, where the requirement that liens
be noted upon the title does not-apply to sales by distributing dealers, liens arising out of such transactions
need not be noted upon the certificate, but must be filed in the chattel mortgage records. Butler County
Finance Co. v. Miller, 225 S. W.2d 135 (Mo. App. 1949).
... Upon the general problem of the negotiability of chattel paper see Kripke, Chattel Paper as a
Negotiable Specialty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 59 YA, E L. J. 1209 (195o).
... Since the inventory lien must be entered upon the certificate of title or manufacturer's certificate,
the assignee will see the lien upon the certificate if the lien has been perfected properly; if the inventory
lien has not been perfected the assignee will be a good faith purchaser. Cf. Tharp v. San Joaquin Valley
Securities Co., 20 Cal. App.2d 20o, 66 P.2d 230 (1937).
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the states requiring inventory liens to be registered upon the title certificate. Where,
however, no provision is made for perfecting inventory liens through the title instru-
ment, as in California, the matter is left wholly to case law. Several California de-
cisions have protected the assignee of the retail paper who receives a clear title
certificate.206 This result is sound because the title certificate tends to give reliability
to the assignor's rights, and upon the broader principle that this type of obligation
is normally transferred by an assignment of the paper which has assumed a char-
acter of limited negotiability2 T  It may be that the recent legislation governing
assignments of accounts receivable will have some bearing upon the problem.208
This legislation, however, is so poorly drafted that its application to secured obliga-
tions must remain wholly speculative. 09
It is doubtful that the assignee who receives the certificate of title with the other
'California Standard Finance Corp. v. Riverside Finance Co., IxI Cal. App. 151, 295 Pac. 555
(1931) (assignee of conditional sales contract from dealer prevailed over floor plan lienholder where
dealer assigned unencumbered certificate of title); Western States Acceptance Corp. v. Bank of Italy, 104
Cal. App. 19, 285 Pac. 340 (1930) (finance company holding a trust receipt upon a motor vehicle sold
by the dealer to a second dealer and resold to a purchaser in course of trade defeated by assignee of
contract); W. People's Finance & Thrift Co. v. Bowman, 58 Cal. App.2d 729, 137 P.2d 729 (1943).
Other decisions will be found where an assignee has been given priority over a prior inventory lien,
although the assignee did not acquire the certificate of title. Bank of America Nat. T. & Say. Ass'n
v. National Funding Corp., 45 Cal. App.2d 320, 114 P.2d 49 (1941); L. B. Motors, Inc. v. Prichard, 303
Ill. App. 313, 25 N. E.2d 129 (1940). But cf. Universal Credit Co. v. Citizens State Bank, 224 Ind. I,
64 N. E.2d 28 (1945) (trust receipt valid against claims of subsequent assignee of conditional sale con-
tracts). A lien upon inventory does not extend to negotiable instruments or documents transferred to a
good faith purchaser, and this principle is incorporated in the Uniform Trust Receipts Act which extends
the definition of such documents by including
"purchasers taking from the trustee for value, in good faith, and by transfer in the customary
manner instruments in such form as are by common practice purchased and sold as iE negoti-
able. . . ."
UmFoam TRusT REcEipTS AcT §9.
"" Cf. UNIFoaR TRusT R xcxp's ACT §9(a). But 4. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Associ-
ates Discount Corp., 38 N. Y. S.2d 972 (Syracuse Munic. Ct. 1942), rev'd on other grounds, 267 App.
Div. 1032, 48 N. Y. S.2d 242 (4 th Dep't 1944). An excellent outline of the difficulty in giving chattel
paper the aspects of negotiability is furnished by Kripke, Chattel Paper as a Negotiable Specialty Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 59 YALE L. J. 1209 (195o). Mr. Kripke points out that one of the
principal difficulties with the problem of giving credit value to this paper is the fact that two separate
transactions are involved. One is the debt, and the other the lien or security interest. The title certificate
does not solve this problem, except by giving reliability and authenticity to the security instrument.
"'In general, see Koessler, Arew Legislation Affecting Non-Notification Financing of Accounts
Receivable, 44 MicH. L. REv. 563 (1946); Dunham, Inventory and Accounts Financing, 62 HAiW. L.
Rav. 588 (1949).
209E.g., CAL. Civ. CODE §3017 (Supp. 1949) (excluding obligations represented by a "note, draft,
acceptance, or other instrument for the payment of money"); IDAHo CoDE ANN. §64-901(l) (1948) (ex-
cluding obligations which are "secured by a chattel mortgage, or other instrument which may be filed
in a public office"); IND. ANN. STrAT. §19-2101 (Burns Replacement i95o) (excluding "mortgages and
other obligations with respect to which statutory provision has been or shall be made for the record
or filing of assignments"); MicH. CoMp. LAws §6 91.9ox(i)(a) (1948) (excluding any right "evidenced
by a negotiable instrument"); N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §4 4-77()(d) (Supp. 1949) (excluding "a chattel
mortgage, deed of trust, conditional sale or other instrument, which is required to be recorded"); OHIO
GEN. CoDE ANN. §8509-5 (Supp. 1949) (excluding obligations "evidenced by note, bond, bill of
exchange or certificate of indebtedness of any kind"); Tax. STAT., CIvIL CoDE art. 26o-x, § x (I)(b) (1948)
(excluding obligations "secured by a chattel mortgage, a conditional sale, contract, or other instrument
which may be filed for record"); cf. Goggin v. Bank of America Nat. T. & Say. Ass'n, 183 F.2d 322 (9 th
Cir. i95o) (banker's lien).
THE CASE OF THE MysTmUous ACCESSORY
papers can claim negotiability in the tide certificate to defeat defenses in favor of
the lien-debtor against the seller-assignor2 1  While the tide instrument may tend to
show that the assignor has an unimpeachable security interest in the vehicle, the
conceptualistic common law policy of separating the debt from the security would
indicate that the tide laws were intended to impart notice of the lien interest only.
This leads to the more difficult question of whether or not the assignment obligor
must make payments to the assignee in possession of the certificate and demand
that payments be noted on the tide certificate?"' The legislative vacuum on the
subject offers no solution. In the case of retail paper, it seems unreasonable to
burden the buyer-debtor with this duty in view of the trust which normally grows
out of this course of dealing. Eleven states have adopted express provisions relating
to assignments and most of them contemplate that transfers of the lienholder's
rights may clear through the central motor vehicle agency.' 2 Legislative purpose
for these provisions is not expressed, and a lack of case law upon the subject 213 limits
further consideration of the problem. Here, however, is a demonstrated need for
uniform codification.
Reliability of the tide certificate as showing the rights of the assignor, and the
assignment debtor, is weakened where prior possessory rights in the vehicle are
claimed by third parties. Not uncommonly a dealer will sell a motor vehicle without
giving up the certificate of tide, with the consequence that he has in his possession
an instrumentality which can be used for fraudulent purposes. If the dealer pur-
ports to resell upon a fake conditional sale, or sale with mortgage back, to one of his
employees, the spurious chattel paper may be discounted to an unsuspecting financer,
who perhaps is too willing to accept the presence of the tide certificate as conclusive
evidence of the genuineness of the transaction. Here the courts have usually pro-
tected a prior buyer or lienholder in possession, although he is without clear title
2. Cf. General Acceptance Corp. v. Davis, 169 Kan. 220, 218 P.2d 181 (ig5o). For a case where
the assignee acquired a negotiable instrument as a holder in due course, see C. I. T. Corp. v. Byrnes, 38
S. W.2d 750 (Mo. App. 1931) (debtor could not set up invalidity of sale under title certificate laws).
211 If the lien secures a negotiable promissory note, the lien-debtor must obtain the promissory note
upon payment; failure to record the assignment is not usually regarded as fatal. Interstate Nat. Bank v.
Koster, 131 Kan. 461, 292 Pac. 805 (1930). Where a negotiable instrument is not involved, authority
upon the problem of chattel liens is very scanty. Cf. 17 GEo. L. J. 358 (1929) (criticizing rule that
real estate mortgagor must look to records before making payment). The debtor may require the lien-
holder to surrender the certificate of title upon tender of payment. Pacific Finance Corp. v. Gherna, 36
Ariz. 509, 287 Pac. 304 (930); Larison-Frees Chevrolet Co. v. Payne, x63 Ore. 276, 96 P.2d io67
(939); cf. Acquisto v. Bank of America Nat. T. & Say. Aas'n, 2r3 P.2d 775 (Cal. App. 1950).
Under the Code, payment by the lien-debtor to the assignor of chattel paper is privileged where
the assignor is left in possession of paper which does not specify a different place of payment. U. C. C.
§9-319 (Sept. 1950). Quaere: Whether the account debtor may safely pay the assignor without demanding
the chattel paper?
222 See App. 3, col. ii. None of the states with "incomplete" certificate of title laws have such
provisions. Cf. App. 2.
2 5 In General Credit Corp. v. Lee James, Inc., S NVash.2d 185, I11 P.2d 762 (1941), the assignee,
F, held a certificate of title showing a lien in favor of the assignor, D. Subsequently D repossessed the
vehicle, and on repossession sale sold to P for whom D obtained a duplicate certificate. Held for P on
the ground that the assignment was not entered upon the mortgage records where the lien had also been
filed.
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papers2 14  Judges occasionally have been tempted to sympathize with the assignee
bank in such situations on grounds of estoppel, but the scant judicial authority in
point has wholly failed to penetrate the real problem. The common law always
- recognized possession of both real and personal property as imparting constructive
notice of equities retained by the party in possessionP t  Difficulty with the title
certificate laws arises from their all inclusive language purporting to require "liens
and encumbrances" to be shown upon the tide 16  It is reasonable to suppose that
the omission of possessory interests was a legislative oversight which in fact recog-
nized a common law principle so well established as to be unworthy of specific ex-
clusion. Therefore, the constructive notice of liens upon the title certificate should
be qualified by the common law principles protecting prior pledge or other posses-
sory interests. Consequently, the assignee bank must either trust in the honesty of
the assignor, or determine for itself the possessory claims of third parties.
One further hazard which has not been removed by the assignment of a duly per-
fected certificate of title occurs when a dealer, otherwise unable to get inventory credit,
purports to sell to a salesman or a member of his staff upon a lien-retaining contract.
This lien contract may then be discounted to either a suspecting or an unsuspecting
financial institution which is willing to advance credit on the basis of the added
security. For all substantial purposes, this leaves the dealer in possession with an
apparent power of sale. Consequently, in those states which favor the buyer in
regular course of trade, the courts have shown an inclination to protect the buyer,
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especially where the buyer obtains an unencumbered title certificate.218 This places
21. Dennis v. Bank of America Nat. T. & Sav. Ass'n, 34 Cal. App.2d 618, 94 P.2d 51 (1939); San
Joaquin Valley Sec. Co. v. Prather, 123 Cal. App. 378, I P.2d 45 (932); Peper v. American Exchange
Nat. Bank, 257 Mo. 652, 210 S. W.2d 41 (1948); cf. Janney v. Bell, xii F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1940)
(lienholder who obtained possession prevailed over creditors where lien was not perfected upon ide
certificate); Henry v. General Forming, Ltd., 33 Cal.2d 233, 200 P.2d 785 (1948) (possession of vehicle
defeated rights of asserted owner out of possession); Colorado State Bank v. Riede, 92 Colo. 361, 20
P.2d 1oio (1933) (purchaser in possession of new automobile who received only bill of sale prevailed
over subsequent lien given by dealer); Universal Credit Co. v. Botetourt Motor Co., i8o Va. 159, 21
S. E.2d 8oo (1942) (inventory lienholder without certificate of title who acquired possession preferred
over subsequent lien creditors). But c. Chelhar v. Acme Gararge, 18 Cal. App.2d 775, 61 P.2d 1232
(1936) (mortgagee who repossessed and purchased on foreclosure sale defeated by subsequent lien
creditors); Associates Inv. Co. v. Le Boutillier, 69 Ohio App. 62, 42 N. E.2d soii (194) (dealer sold to
buyer who obtained vehicle without manufacturer's certificate-held subsequent inventory lienholder
prevailed). In Rasmussen v. 0. E. Lee & Co., 104 Mont. 278, 66 P.2d i19 (1937), an automobile
was sold by a dealer to a fake purchaser, and this contract assigned to F. Thereafter the automobile was
sold to B in regular course of trade who obtained a title certificate in his name. Subsequently, B traded
in the vehicle and assigned the tide to the dealer in blank. The dealer then turned the vehicle over to
F. Held for B on the theory that the re-transfer to F did not technically comply with the tide certificate
statute.
... This of course is the basis of Twyne's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 8o b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (K. B. x6ox).
Consequently in order to qualify as a good faith purchaser, one must always examine the possessory
rights in the property. 3 GLENP;, MORTGAGES S§387-389 (1943).
21. States which expressly exclude possessory interests or pledges are Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
District of Columbia, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Utah. See App. 3, col. 7.
2.. Cf. Automobile Finance Co. v. Munday, 137 Ohio St. 504, 30 N. E.2d 1002 (1940) (decided
on grounds that fake purchaser did not technically get title); Erie County United Bank v. Bogart, 75
Ohio App. 250, 61 N. E.2d 811 (1944) (decided on ground that fake purchaser was wholly fictitious).
218 Buss v. McKee, xi5 Colo. 159, 170 P.2d 268 (1946); Guaranty Discount Corp. v. Bowers, 94
Ind. App. 373, 158 N. E. 231 (1931) (assignee bank had no actual knowledge that automobile displayed
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a burden upon the discounting bank to determine the identity of the lien-debtors on
assigned paper, at least in the states where purchasers in the regular course of trade
will be protected. However, the rule discourages an evil practice upon the part of
lenders to advance inventory credit under this type of arrangement, at least where
the practice is well established or known.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code. The title certificate may create several
obscure, but not insolvable, problems under the "chattel paper" provisions of the
Commercial Code. 1 In substance the Code recognizes that liens on chattel paper
may be perfected in one of two ways: First, by possession of the paper;22 second, by
filing.22' However, a purchaser of chattel paper created by the sale of inventory will
prevail over an earlier filed security interest when possession of the paper is acquired
in the ordinary course of his business and without knowledge of the earlier lien 2 2 In
this case the title certificate may be decisive of the question of "knowledge. 223 Thus
suppose that Fr takes a lien upon D's after-acquired or existing chattel paper secured
by liens on motor vehicles and this is duly perfected by filing. Subsequently, D
assigns the chattel paper covered by the first lien to P2, who has no actual knowledge
of the first security interest. (Where should Fi have filed his lien? By registration
on the certificate of tide? Presumably the Code !anticipates that filing will be
governed by the general filing provisions, and not the motor vehicle section." 4)
Suppose, then, that this lien is filed in the general records, and F2 acquires among
the papers received a certificate of tide showing a lien in favor of D? Or suppose
that the chattel paper is unaccompanied by a tide certificate? Or suppose that it is,
but the tide certificate shows that the lien has been assigned to Fi?
In these cases the Code literally purports to protect /2, except where the ac-
companying tide certificate shows an assignment to Fr because "a notation on the
chattel paper that it has been assigned is sufficient" '22 to constitute knowledge.
for sale); Sorensen v. Pagenkopf, 151 Kan. 913, 101 P.2d 928 (1940) (assignee bank had no actual notice
that automobile displayed for sale-court imposed duty to determine character of loan because of custom
on part of dealers to finance inventory in this manner); Rasmussen v. 0. E. Lee & Co., Inc., 104 Mont.
278, 66 P.2d 119 ('937) (demonstrator sold on fake sale); People's Finance & Thrift Co. v. Shirk, 181
Okla. 418, 74 P.2d 379 (1937). In states which do not require inventory liens to be noted upon the
certificate, a prior inventory lien will prevail over the assignee under a fake sale upon the theory that
the lien is taken out of the regular course of trade. California Standard Fin. Corp. v. Riverside Fin. Co.,
iii Cal. App. 151, 295 Pac. 555 (193); cf. Universal Credit Co. v. M. C. Gale, Inc., 40 Cal. App.2d 796,
105 P.2d 1003 (1940) (lien upon vehicle titled in name of dealer's president valid against creditors).
"'xU. C. C. §§9-304, 9-305, 9-308 (Sept. 1950).
.
2 U. C. C. §9-305 (Sept. 1950). 12 1 U. C. C. §9-304 (Sept. 1950).
"'U. C. C. §9-3o8(i)(b) (Sept. i95o). In other cases the subsequent assignee obtaining possession
is defeated by the prior perfected lien. Id. §9-3o8(i)(a).
"' "Knowledge that a security interest exists in inventory or that a security interest is claimed in the
proceeds of the inventory is not sufficient to give knowledge that a security interest exists in the chattel
paper in possession of the debtor, but a notation on the chattel paper that it has been assigned is sufficient."
U. C. C. §9-308(2) (Sept. 1950)
... Note that the Code provides for the filing of liens upon chattel paper under the general filing
provision. U. C. C. §9-401 (Sept. 195o). However, inventory liens upon motor vehicles are registered
upon the certificate of tide, with consequent dilemma as to whether this includes after-acquired property.
This quandary could be solved by excluding inventory liens from the motor vehicle provision.
"' See note 223 supra.
234 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
However, the "good faith" section =6 of the Code may apply to require assignees of
chattel paper secured by security interests in motor vehicles to get the certificate of
tide. Since comment to that section requires "professionals" to acquire a tide cer-
tificate, there is some likelihood that assignee bankers and finance companies are
included within the intent of the section. 7  The uncertainty here could be elim-
inated by requiring the assignee of motor vehicle chattel paper to acquire the
necessary tide certificate, and this could be done by defining chattel paper 228 to
include the tide certificate.
Some further difficulty arises from the Code provision permitting liens to be
registered upon the certificate of tide.29 This section applies only to those states
where provision is made for registration of "all liens" upon the title certificate.
Literally, the provision tends to exclude most tide certificate states since the statutes
and decisions are quite decisive in holding that possessory liens need not be entered
upon the tide certificate.P ° In addition, this section further provides that a security
interest in motor vehicles is perfected by registration upon the certificate of title, thus
by implication excluding the possibility of perfecting liens by possession of the
vehicle. Neither of these constructions, however, is reasonable since the section
falls within the chapter on filing, thus indicating that other methods for perfecting
liens are left to the other parts of the Code.3 1  These technical difficulties could
easily be avoided by making the Code provision applicable to non-possessory liens
only, and by forthright language including all states with title certificate laws.
IV
CONCLUSION
The uniform pattern of the legislation in all the states with "incomplete" and
"comprehensive" certificate of title laws lends itself to incorporation within the
security provisions of the Code as a means for imparting constructive notice of liens
upon motor vehicles. Technical differences between the many separate laws may
result in numerous unpredictable exclusions as a direct result of the Code language
including only states providing for the registration of "all" liens. The Code re-
quirement that a security interest will be perfected only when the lien is registered
upon the tide certificate by the central motor vehicle agency will perpetuate the
growing litigation in cases where the lienholder retains possession of the certificate
without formal registration. Inadequacy of the tide certificate for showing inventory
liens makes for further difficulty.
The reader is invited to give cautious consideration to a recommendation that
Section 9-4o2 be amended by a provision to read:
2 5 U. C. C. §1-203, comment 2 (Spring i95o). "27 Discussed at notes io3-io8 supra.2 
'Chattel paper' means a writing of a type whose transfer in ordinary course of business requires
delivery and which evidences a security interest in or lease of goods." U. C. C. §9-1os()(b) (Sept.
,950).
1 5 U. C. C. §9-402 (Sept. 1950). "3°See note 214 supra.
." U. C. C. §9-3o5 (Sept. I95o).
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In all states with certificate of title laws a non-possessory security interest in motor
vehicles other than on inventory is perfected when
(i) properly registered upon the certificate of tide, or
(2) possession of the certificate of title is retained or acquired by the secured lender.
A security interest perfected by possession of the certificate ceases to be perfected at the
time when the debtor or one claiming under him obtains a clear duplicate certificate of tide.
This suggested amendment would:
(i) Include all of the states with certificate of tide laws.
(2) Provide protection to the lienholder in possession of the vehicle.
(3) Require inventory liens and liens on chattel paper to be filed or perfected under
the other provisions of the Code.
(4) Recognize possession of the title certificate by the secured lender as imparting
constructive notice of liens.
This should do much to solve the mystery surrounding the certificate of tide.
APPENDIX I
STATES WITH REGISTRATION LAws
ALABAMA CONNECTICUT GEORGIA IOWA KENTUCKY
1. Mtgors and cond'] bayers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
required to register Ala. Code Ann. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ga. Code Ann. Iowa Code Ky. Roy. Stat.
tit. 36, § 1(0) 2350(29) (194) § 68-101 (1937) 321.1(35) (1046) § 186,10(6) (1948)(1940)
2. Transferor required to notify Yes Yes No provision Yes No
or return certificate to central Id. tit. 51, Id. §§ 2364, 2361 Id. § 321.45 Id, § 186,190(3)
department by penal law § 706 (Supp. 1945)
3. Transferor required to No provision No provision Yes Yes Yes
assign certificate Id. §§ 68-207, (both transferor-ce Id. §§ 186.19068-9908 required to sign (3-4), .00
certificate)
Id. §§ 321.45, .46
4. Provisions for liens No provision No provision Yes No provision No provision(on the assign-
ment by trans-
feror-lien inst.
not filed)
Id. § 68-207
5. Records and indexes Mechanics not Yes Yes Yes Yes
clear (by Comm'r of (Revenue Comm'r (in counties and (by Dept. of
Cf. Id. tit. 51, Al. V.) records alphabeti- Dept. of M. V.) Revenue)
8 705 (1940) Id. § 2352 cally by counties) Id. 88 321.21, .31 Id. § 186.240(2)
Id. § 68-10a
6. Certificate required to be No provision Yes No provision Yes No provision
carried on vehicle __ Id. § 2362 Id. 88 321.32, .33
,AbSA- NEWMAINE CHUSETTS MINNESOTA MISSISSIPPI HAMPSHIRE
1. Mtgors and cond'l buyers Yes No provision Yes Yes Yes
required to register Me. Rev. Stat. Minn. Stat. Miss. Code. Ann. N. H. Rev. Laws
c. 19, § 1 (1944) § 168.011(5) § 9352-02 (1948 o. 115, § 1 (sx)(1949) supp.) (1042)
2. Transferor required to notify No provision Yes Yes No provision Yes
or return certificate to central Mass. Gen. Laws Id. H8 168.15, (Transterce must Id. o. 110, § 13
department by penal law c. 90, §§ 2, 20 .10(4) present tax receipt)
(1946) Id. § 93o2-19
3. Transferor required to No provision No provision Yes Seller rejuired to No provision
assign certificate (transferee to sign execute bill of
& join in returning sale."
to Registrar) Id. § 806-67
Ibid. (1042)
4. Provisions for liens No provision No provision No provision No provision No provision
5. Records and indexes Yes Yes Yes Bill of sale may be Yes(by Sec'y of (by Registrar of (by Registrar of recorded with (by Comm'r of
State) Al. V.) M. V.) Clerk of County M. V.)
Id. c. 19, § 13 Id. c. 90, § 2 Id. § 168.33(3) Court Id, o. 116, § 2
Id. § 8066
6. Certificate required to be No provision Yes No provision Bill of sale must No provision
carried on vehicle Id. c. 90, § 11 be exhibited
upon velicla
Id§807 
-
NEW YORK RHODE ISLAND SOUTH CAROLINA* VERMONT
1. Mtgors and cond'l buyers Yes Yes Yes Yes
required to register N. Y. Vehicle & .I. Gen. Laws S. C. Code Ann. Vt. Stat. § 10,044
Traffic Law § 2 c 86, § 1(16) 8 1623(1)(u) (1942) (xx) (1947)(18) (1941) (1938)
2. Transferor required to notify No provision Yes Yes Yes
or return certificate to central Id. c. 86, § 3, Id. § 5904 Id. §O 10,075,
department by penal law c. 104 1 (8) 10,324
3. Transferor required to No provision No provision No provision No provision
assign certificate
4. Provisions for liens No provision No provision Yes No provision(Application for regis-
tration to show liens-
lien inst. not filed)
Id. 8 5894(17)
(Supp. 1948)
5. Records and indexes Yes Yes Yes Yes(by Bureau of M. V.) Id. c. 86, § 2 (by State Highway (by Dept. of l. V,)
Id. 8 11 (2) Dept.) Id, § 10,017
Id. § 5893 (1942)
6. Certificate required to be Yes Yes No provision Yes
carried on vehicle Id. 8 11(4) Id. c. 86, § 2 Id. § 10,074
* These statutes have since been drastically amended. S. C. Acts 1949, No. 223.
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